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State Medical Malpractice Screening Panels in
Federal Diversity Actions
Vincent C. Alexander*
During the early 1970's, a medical malpractice crisis was perceived
in the United States.' An increasing number of costly and time-con-
suming lawsuits alleging medical malpractice against doctors, hospitals,
and other health care providers caused malpractice insurers to raise
premiums substantially, which in turn threatened to curtail the availa-
bility of adequate health care at reasonable cost.2 State legislatures re-
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University. B.A., 197 1, Yale University; J.D., 1975.
St. John's University.
1. In January of 1973, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare released a com-
prehensive study of the medical malpractice crisis in the United States which sought to identify
and analyze the problem and recommend solutions. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT]. At least one state appellate court has questioned
the existence within its own jurisdiction of any such crisis. Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97
Idaho 859, 872-73, 555 P.2d 399, 412-13 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). See Prendergast
v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 126, 256 N.W.2d 657, 674 (1977) (Clinton, J., dissenting).
2. The HEW Report recognized an increase both in the number of malpractice claims and
in the size of awards and settlements. HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 6, 10. It was also observed
that many medical malpractice actions are more expensive to litigate and take longer to resolve
than other personal injury actions. Id at 11; Mallor, A Curefor the Plaintiffs Ills, 51 IND. L.J.
103, 104 (1975); Comment, The Medical Ma/practice Mediation Panel in the First Judicial Depart-
ment of New York" An Alternative to Litigation, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 261, 265 (1974). Because of
the high cost of increased litigation, medical malpractice insurers raised premiums substantially.
Health care providers could be expected to pass this cost along to patients in the form of higher
fees for services, with resulting economic harm to the public. HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 12-
14. It was feared that some practitioners might abandon the medical profession, curtail their
services or migrate to a state in which insurance is more readily available, thereby creating a
shortage in health care services. See Note, Rx for New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11
COLUM. J. OF L. & Soc. PROB. 467, 469-70 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rxfor New York].
Increased litigation also has tempted some doctors to practice "defensive medicine." Such
practice consists of administering unnecessary diagnostic or therapeutic tests, or of refusing to give
such tests where they might be beneficial, for the purpose of defending against or preventing
claims for liability. HEW REPORT, supra note I, at 14-15; Roth, The Medical Malpractice Insur-
ance Crisis: Its Causes, The Effects, and Proposed Solutions, 44 INS. CouNs. J. 469, 474 (1977); Rx
for New York, supra, at 477-78.
The causes for increased claims of malpractice are varied and complex. The prime cause,
according to the HEW Report, is an increase in the number of patient injuries. HEW REPORT,
supra note 1, at 24. Other causes include general breakdown of the traditional doctor-patient
relationship, unrealistic expectations aroused in patients by the media concerning the availability
of cures for many illnesses, and greater litigiousness on the part of the public. See generally HEW
REPORT, supra note 1, at 25; Roth, supra, at 470-73; Note, Recent Medical Malpractice Legisla-
tion-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REv. 655, 655-60 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Recent Medical
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sponded to the crisis with a variety of substantive and procedural
measures intended to reduce the number of litigated claims and the size
of jury awards.3 One of the principal steps taken in a majority of states
was the creation of extrajudicial panels comprised of some combination
of doctors, attorneys, judges, and laymen for the consideration of medi-
cal malpractice claims prior to the ordinary trial process. Such panels,
variously termed screening, mediation, review, advisory, hearing, or ar-
bitration panels, generally determine in an informal manner whether a
plaintiff's claim has merit before it is presented to a jury, thereby facili-
tating early settlement of meritorious claims and discouraging the pros-
ecution of groundless ones. The desired result is a reduction in the
costs, expenses, and consumption of time associated with the litigation
of medical malpractice actions in the courts, thus easing the malprac-
tice crisis.4
Inevitably, some medical malpractice claims find their way into
federal district courts pursuant to diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction.5
Malpractice Legislation]. Many doctors feel that the root cause of the problem is the contingent
fee system, whereby an attorney takes a case for an injured patient under an arrangement in which
no fee is charged unless there is a settlement or judgment in the client's favor. See HEW REPORT,
supra note I, at 32-34; Rxfor New York, supra, at 479-80.
3. Legislation aimed solely at medical malpractice claims has included: imposition of a
ceiling on the amount of collectible damages; elimination of the "collateral source rule," which
prevents deductions from damage awards of payments received by an injured patient from his
own insurance or other sources; clarification of the doctrine of "informed consent," a theory of
liability based on a physician's failure adequately to disclose to the patient the risks of treatment;
elimination of claims based on failure to achieve guaranteed results unless the promise was made
in writing; restrictions on the use of res psa loguitur as a means of establishing negligence; reduc-
tion of the limitations period within which claims may be brought; prohibition in the pleadings of
addamnum clauses specifying the amount of damages being sought; and imposition of ceilings on
attorney's contingent fee arrangements. See generally Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative
Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 Duke L.J. 1417, 1418-55; Recent Medical Mal-
practice Legislation, supra note 2, at 666-79.
4. See HEW REPORT, supra note I, at 91. Reductions in the overall frequency and costs of
litigation should result in lower malpractice insurance premiums for health care providers and
help maintain the quality and quantity of health services. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d
1164, 1174 (5th Cir. 1979); Roth, supra note 2, at 497; Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation,
supra note 2, at 679.
5. Under the diversity statute currently in effect, federal district courts have original subject
matter jurisdiction in all suits between citizens of different states if the amount in controversy
exceeds $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976). In addition, defendants sued in state courts may
remove the action to federal court if the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, there is complete
diversity of citizenship, and none of the defendants is a citizen of the state in which the action was
commenced. Id § 1441(a), (b).
The commonly accepted historical rationale for inclusion of diversity-of-citizenship jurisdic-
tion in the Constitution is the fear that out-of-state suitors might be subjected to bias or prejudice
in local courts and therefore should have the advantage of a more neutral forum with an impartial
judge. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
Many authorities today question the continuing validity of this rationale, as well as the bene-
fits of diversity jurisdiction in general, and two bills are pending in the 96th Congress which would
virtually eliminate diversity jurisdiction by limiting it to suits between United States citizens and
aliens, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)-(4) (1976), and to federal statutory interpleader actions, id § 1335.
See S. 679, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S2869 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1979); H.R. 2202, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H692 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1979). The same legislation was ap-
proved by the House of Representatives of the 95th Congress, H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124
CONG. REc. H1569 (1978), but the Senate Bill, S. 2389, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoNG. Ruc. 528
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If the federal court is located in a state which requires the screening of
such claims, the court must decide whether, and to what extent, the
panel procedures must be utilized. The court's decision will be based
on the resolution of several issues: Whether the particular claim and
litigants fall within the scope of the panel legislation;6 whether the leg-
islation is constitutional under state and federal principles of equal pro-
tection, due process, and the right to jury trial;7 and whether the
(1978), was never reported out ofthe Judiciary Committee. A less radical proposal would increase
the requisite amount in controversy and disallow the plaintiff from invoking diversity jurisdiction
in a federal court located in plaintiff's own state of citizenship. This proposal was made to the
95th Congress by the Department of Justice. S. 2094, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REC.
S14870 (1978).
The bench, bar and academic community are divided on the issue. See, e.g., ALl, STUDY OF
THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 12-13 (1969) (favoring
curtailment); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 139-52 (1973) (favoring
abolition or curtailment); Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7 (1963)
(favoring retention); Committee on Federal Legislation, The Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 33 THE RECORD OF THE Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK 493 (1978) (favoring retention). A summary of the arguments for and against
diversity jurisdiction is contained in 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3601 (1975). A novel solution to the problem is proposed
in Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARv. L. REV. 317 (1977).
Professor Shapiro concludes that diversity jurisdiction need not be handled on a uniform basis
applicable to all federal district courts. He would leave the decision on abolishment, retention, or
curtailment of diversity jurisdiction to the vote of the judges of each district, who could regulate
the matter by local rule. Id at 339-40.
One of the arguments against diversity jurisdiction is related to the problem addressed in this
article, namely, the requirement under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), that federal
judges apply state law in diversity cases. Some federal judges dislike this inhibition on their abil-
ity to "make new law" and are disturbed by the frequently encountered difficulty of ascertaining
state law. H. FRIENDLY, supra, at 142-43, To the extent that Congress curtails diversity jurisdic-
tion, the practical utility of this article will be reduced proportionately.
6. For example, some states recognize contractual theories of liability against doctors whose
treatment does not meet with patient approval, and the question might arise whether such claims
are subject to screening. See Salem Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Quinn, - Mass. -, -, 386
N.E.2d 1268, 1271-73 (1979) (patient's contractual claim for breach of promise to produce a spe-
cific medical result held to fall within scope of legislation requiring screening of actions for "mal-
practice, error or mistake"). In addition, there is lack of uniformity among the states with respect
to the designation of defendants who are subject to the panel procedures. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE
§ 6-1001 (1979) (physicians, surgeons, and general hospitals); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2 (Burns
Supp. 1979) ("health care providers"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.040 (1977) (physicians and associ-
ates, servants, agents or employees, and nurses).
A problem recently resolved in Pennsylvania is whether that state's preaction arbitration
panel is applicable to third-party claims for contribution by one health care provider against an-
other. Both federal and state courts have held that the panel should be utilized only for claims
brought by patients. Zielinski v. Zappala, 470 F. Supp. 351, 354 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Staub v. South-
west Butler County School Dist., - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 398 A.2d 204 (1979). A related question is
whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the convening of a panel is required solely for a
particular state court, which could eliminate the Erie problem in federal court. See note 186 infra.
7. Legislation requiring the screening of medical malpractice claims, as opposed to other
types of tort claims, is potentially violative of the equal protection and due process provisions of
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and analogous provisions of state
constitutions. It also raises questions under state constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right
of trial by jury and, in federal diversity actions, under the seventh amendment of the United
States Constitution. The legislation may also violate unique state constitutional provisions, such
as prohibitions against the vesting ofjudicial power in nonmembers of the judiciary or guarantees
of free access to the courts. See generally Lenore, Mandatory Medical Malpractice Mediation
Panels- Constitutional Examination, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 416, 419-26 (1977); Redish, Legislative
Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REV.
759, 769-96 (1977); Note, Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels: A Constitutional Analysis, 46
1979]
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legislation is a state law which must be applied in federal court under
the Rules of Decision Act8 as construed by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins9
and its progeny.
The constitutionality of screening panels has been upheld by most
courts that have considered the issue,' 0 and other commentators have
treated the subject in depth." This article focuses upon the three
unique problems presented by the applicability of screening panel leg-
islation in federal courts: Erie, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the
seventh amendment right to jury trial.12 Section I surveys the principal
types of screening panels that have been utilized to date. Section II
analyzes the evolution of the standard to be applied under Erie in de-
termining whether state rules having both procedural and substantive
attributes must be applied in federal courts. The recommended test is a
flexible one, but in accordance with the principles of federalism, it pre-
FORDHAM L. REV. 322, 328-46 (1977); Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Med/calMafractice
Review Boards, 46 TENN. L. REV. 607, 610-32 (1979); 1977 Wis. L. REV. 203.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
9. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. The following decisions have upheld the constitutionality of screening panels against
challenges made on the grounds indicated in parentheses: Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d
1164, 1170-81 (5th Cir. 1979) (right to jury trial, due process, equal protection) (Florida panel
provisions); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 426-34 (N.D. Ind. 1979), ajj'don other
grounds, 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979) (right to jury trial, due process, equal protection, access to
state courts) (Indiana panel provisions); Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468,
471-74 (E.D. La. 1979) (right to jury trial, due process, equal protection) (Louisiana panel provi-
sions); Davison v. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978) (right to jury trial)
(Marland panel provisions); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 579-83, 570 P.2d 744, 747-51(1977) (right to jury trial, equal protection, violation of state judicial functions); Carter v. Spark-
man, 335 So. 2d 802. 804-06 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (due process, equal
protection, access to state courts, violation of state judicial functions); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.
2d 1256, 1265-70 (La. 1978) (due process, equal protection, access to state courts); Attorney Gen-
eral v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 283-314, 385 A.2d 57, 63-80, appeal dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 60 (1978)
(right to jury trial, equal protection, access to state courts, violation of state judicial functions);
Paro v. Longwood Hosp., - Mass. -, -, 369 N.E.2d 985, 987-93 (1977) (right to jury trial, due
process, equal protection, access to state courts, violation of separation of powers); Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 103-13, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663-68 (1977) (right to jury trial, due process,
equal protection, access to state courts, usurpation of judicial functions); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55
A.D.2d 304, 307-15, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125-30 (1976), afdon other grounds, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372
N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977) (right to jury trial, due process, equal protection); Parker v.
Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 116-30, 394 A.2d 932, 937-44 (1978) (right to jury trial, due process,
violation of state judicial functions); Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 506-20, 523-31, 261
N.W. 2d 434, 441-48, 449-53 (1978) (right to jury trial, due process, equal protection).
The following decisions have declared screening panels unconstitutional on the grounds indi-
cated in parentheses: Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 111. 2d 313, 324, 347 N.E.2d 736,
739-41 (1976) (violation of right to jury trial, vesting of judicial functions in nonjudicial person-
nel); Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. For Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Mo. 1979)
(access to state courts); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 166-70, 355
N.E.2d 903, 906-09 (1976) (violation of right to jury trial and of equal protection).
11. See commentaries cited in note 7 supra.
12. Erie and the Federal Rules of Evidence are, by definition exclusive concerns of the fed-
eral courts, and the seventh amendment right to jury trial has not been extended to the states. See
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241
U.S. 211, 217 (1916). Other relevant constitutional questions could arise in both state and federal
courts. If the panel legislation is unconstitutional, the Erie problem need not be addressed be-
cause federal courts may not apply unconstitutional state laws in any event. Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949).
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vents impairment of clearly discernible substantive policies of the
states. Section III takes up the question whether Erie requires compli-
ance with screening panel hearings in federal courts under such stan-
dard. Section IV examines the trio of authorities-Erie, the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and the seventh amendment-that must be consid-
ered in determining whether panel findings may be admitted into evi-
dence at a subsequent trial in federal court. It is concluded that a
proper regard for the principles of federalism requires. application of
screening panel legislation in federal diversity actions in accordance
with state law and that the seventh amendment is not thereby violated.
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SCREENING
PANELS
Unlike measures changing the substantive law of medical mal-
practice, screening panels alter the dispute resolution mechanism. The
concept of screening panels was not new when state legislatures began
to impose them as mandatory steps in the medical malpractice litiga-
tion process. They had been employed on a regional basis through the
voluntary cooperation of physicians and lawyers.'3 Such plans, which
became the prototypes for mandatory screening panels, provided for
the pretrial review of a plaintiff's claim by a panel of "experts" com-
prised either of doctors, or doctors and lawyers in combination. 14 After
an informal presentation of evidence, a panel would state whether it
found sufficient evidence of negligence to warrant the bringing of an
action at law. 5 A finding that the claim had merit was intended to
pressure the defendant into settlement.' 6 Conversely, a panel finding
that the claim was groundless, hopefully, would encourage the plaintiff
and his attorney to abandon the case.' 7 The inherent shortcoming of
voluntary participation has been cured in many states by legislation
imposing screening as a required step in the litigation process.
13. Two notable arrangements were those adopted by physicians and lawyers in Pima
County, Arizona, and by the state medical society and state bar of New Mexico. Baird, Mun-
sterman, & Stevens, Alternatives to Litigation P Technical Analysis, reprinted in HEW REPORT,
supra note 1, at 214, 225 app. Plans that provide for doctors and lawyers as panelists have been
termed "medico-legal" panels. Id Other voluntary arrangements have included medical review
boards consisting solely of doctors who render opinions to other doctors as to whether claims
against them should be settled or defended. Id at 224-25; Abraham, MedicalMalpractice Reform:
A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. REV. 489, 512-13 (1977). A description of the various voluntary
plans is set forth in Gibbs, Malpractice Screening Panels and Arbitration in Medical Liability Dis-
fputes, 1 J. LEGAL MED. 30-36 (1973). See also Mallor, supra note 2, at 109-11; Documentary
Suppmleent, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alternative Approach to Medical Malpractice
Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 695, 704-21 (1972).
14. Baird, Munsterman, & Stevens, supra note 13, reprinted in HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at
283-84 app.
15. Id at 224, 292-93.
16. Id at 224.
17. Id
1979]
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Mandatory screening panels must be distinguished from arbitra-
tion. The latter results in total preclusion of a jury trial by submission
of the claim to a private arbitrator or group of arbitrators who render a
final, binding decision or award which is enforceable by the court.
Screening panels, on the other hand, serve an "advisory" function: If
the panel's decision is rejected by the litigants, they may proceed to
trial in the ordinary manner."8 Arbitration in the traditional sense de-
pends upon the existence of a private agreement between the parties to
submit an existing or future dispute to arbitration.' 9 Many states have
facilitated arbitration of medical malpractice claims by providing for
judicial enforcement of consensual agreements to arbitrate, 20 but no
state has imposed mandatory arbitration of malpractice claims without
providing for a subsequent jury trial in which the arbitrator's award
may be challenged.2 ' Such "arbitration" in effect is a form of screen-
ing.
Although screening panels vary from state to state as to terminol-
ogy, details of composition, and operating procedures, they fall into
two broad categories. The first type, adopted by most states, consists of
panels for the screening of claims prior to the commencement of a law-
suit.22 The majority of such panels are mandatory, imposing a condi-
18. Redish, supra note 7, at 768; Note, supra note 7, at 323. Arbitration is like a screening
panel to the extent that it is intended to provide a quick and inexpensive resolution of a dispute. It
goes a step further than screening by providing a final, binding decision which eliminates any
possibility of a courtroom trial. This aspect of arbitration makes it attractive to members of the
medical profession who distrust juries and are disturbed by the publicity associated with court-
room proceedings. Recent MedicalMalpractice Legislation, supra note 2, at 683. See note 29 in/ra.
19. Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical
Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947, 948 (1972).
20. See Ladimer, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: 1978 Roundup, 668 INs. L.J. 530, 536-40
(1978) (setting forth tables of state legislation providing for enforceability of agreements to arbi-
trate generally and specifically as to medical malpractice claims); Note, MedicalMalpractice Arbi-
tration: A Comparative Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 1285, 1296-1300 (1976).
21. Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania require "arbitration" of all medical malpractice
claims, but each state allows the parties to challenge the award in a courtroom jury trial. MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (Supp. 1979); OHlo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Page
Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.509 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Statutorily imposed arbi-
tration which does not ultimately provide for an "appeal" or trial de novo before a jury probably
would violate due process or the right to jury trial guaranteed by virtually all state constitutions,
See Comment, supra note 3, at 1465-67; Note, supra note 7, at 342-43. Cf. In re Smith, 381 Pa.
223, 112 A.2d 625 (compulsory arbitration of small claims upheld against constitutional challenge
in view of provision for appeal with jury trial), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Smith v. Wissler, 350
U.S. 858 (1955). The HEW Report recommended that any state compulsory arbitration plan
should provide for a subsequent trial de novo upon the request of either party. HEW REPORT,
supra note I, at 92-93.
22. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2601 to -2612 (Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.44, .47
(West Supp. 1979); HAWAn REV. STAT. §§ 671-11 to -20 (1976 and Supp. 1978); IDAHo CODE
§§ 6-1001 to -1013 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to 5-9-10 (Bums. Supp. 1979); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 2801-2809 (Supp. 1978-79); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 538.010 to
.080 (Vernon Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 17-1301 to -1315 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 44-2840 to -2847 (Supp. 1978); Nev. REv. STAT. §§ 41A.010 to .097 (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 519-A:I to A:10 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-1 to -28 (1978); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 32.29.1-01 to -10 (Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.301 to .606 (Purdon Supp.
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tion precedent to suit: The claim must be submitted to the panel before
an action at law may be commenced.23 The second category consists of
court-regulated panels which are not invoked until after an action has
been formally commenced, usually within a fixed period of time after
process and pleadings have been served or filed.24 Most of the
postcommencement panels are compulsory, but some states leave the
matter to the discretion of the judge or the request of the parties.25
1979-80); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-581.1 to .11 (1977 & 1979 Supp.); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.02 to .21
(West Supp. 1979). Each statute, with the exception of Maryland's, explicitly provides that the
initiation of the panel procedure tolls the applicable statute of limitations. Judicial decisions on
the constitutionality of the Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Penn-
sylvania, and Wisconsin statutes are set forth in note 10 supra.
23. All of the states adopting preaction screening procedures have imposed them as prerequi-
sites to the institution of a lawsuit except the following: Arkansas, which leaves the matter to the
voluntary discretion of the plaintiff, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2603 (Supp. 1979); Maine, which al-
lows the plaintiff to request a panel subject to the defendant's acquiescence, ME. REV. STAT. tit.
24, § 2803(1)-(2) (Supp. 1978-79); New Hampshire, which leaves the matter to the voluntary dis-
cretion of the plaintiff, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519-A:2 (1974); and Virginia, which permits ei-
ther the plaintiff or defendant to request a panel, VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 (1977).
Connecticut provides for a completely voluntary screening panel dependent upon a request
from all the parties to a malpractice claim. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-19c (West Supp. 1979).
Kansas allows the parties to a malpractice claim to request the court to convene a panel prior to
the lawsuit, or if the action has already been commenced, allows the court to convene such a panel
sua sponte. KAN. STAT. § 65-4901 (Supp. 1978).
24. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (Supp. 1979) (within 20 days after answer is filed); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (Supp. 1979) (within 10 days after expiration of time for defendant's an-
swer); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6802-6814 (Supp. 1978) (any time after filing of an answer or
motion filed in lieu thereof); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 58.2 to .10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) (no
sooner than 120 days nor later than one year after issue is joined in pleadings); KAN. STAT.
§§ 65.4901 to .4908 (Supp. 1978) (after petition is filed unless all of the parties request a panel
prior to the lawsuit); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1979) (hearing to be held
15 days after answer is filed); N.J. CIv. PRAC. R. 4:21-2(c) (1979) (reference to be scheduled by
pretrial order); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 14 8 -a (McKinney Supp. 1979-80) (after commencement of ac-
tion; no time specified); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Page Supp. 1978) (upon the filing of a
claim); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-19-1 to -10 (Supp. 1978) (hearing to be held within 90 days after
service of process); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3401 to -3413 (Supp. 1978) (after the case is at issue).
Judicial decisions on the constitutionality of the Arizona, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and
Ohio statutes are set forth in note 10 supra.
25. The Alaska statute provides that a panel is to be appointed "unless the court decides that
an expert advisory opinion is not necessary for a decision in the case." ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.55.536(a) (Supp. 1979). Arizona allows the court to waive the panel requirement "upon stip-
ulation of all the parties." ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(A) (Supp. 1979). In Delaware the
panel must be convened only upon the demand of "any party." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6802(b)
(Supp. 1978). Kansas appears to leave the matter to the discretion of the judge, who "may con-
vene" a panel after an action has been commenced or, upon request of all parties, prior to the
action. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4901 (Supp. 1978). New Jersey permits the judge to dispense with
a submission to the panel if there is no issue with respect to the standard of care or violation
thereof, and the sole factual issue is one ofwitness credibility. N.J. Civ. PRAc. R. 4:21-2(d) (1979).
All of the other reference panels are mandatory.
The discretionary system allows the judge to avoid invoking panels in cases that do not re-
quire the purported expertise of the panel, that are trivial in amount, or that might be more easily
resolved by a motion directed to the pleadings or by summary judgment. Note, supra note 7, at
325 n.1, 348.
The Connecticut panel does not fall within either of the two cateories discussed in the text.
The relevant legislation provides that "[w]henever all parties to a claim for malpractice agree,"
they may request the convening of a screening panel by the state division of insurance. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-19c (Supp. 1979). The statute does not state whether the request should be
made prior to commencement of a lawsuit or thereafter. In any event, the screening procedure is
completely voluntary.
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Both types of pretrial screening panels are intended generally to
foster speedy and inexpensive resolutions of medical malpractice
claims. They also serve to limit publicity in connection with a malprac-
tice claim, although they differ somewhat in their ability to achieve this
goal. It is believed that the media has played an adverse role in the
medical malpractice crisis by publicizing the filing of sensational law-
suits and the granting of large jury verdicts.u6 A possible effect of this
publicity is the stirring up of more such litigation.2 7 Out-of-court set-
tlements, which both types of screening panel encourage, usually do
not attract the same degree of media coverage. Preaction panels help
limit publicity by keeping the case out of the courthouse until after a
panel decision is rendered; if the parties accept the decision, no lawsuit
need ever be filed. The postcommencement reference panel, on the
other hand, is less effective in reducing publicity because it functions as
part of the court system itself and is not utilized until after the plead-
ings have become a matter of public record upon filing. 8 Since neither
type of screening panel totally eliminates the ultimate possibility of a
public judicial resolution, some states have taken the additional step of
eliminating the ad damnum from the pleadings, which aids somewhat
in limiting publicity with respect to large damage requests.2 9
26. HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
27. Id
28. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1458 n.203.
29. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-566 (Supp. 1979) (ad damnum eliminated in all
"health actions"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.042(1) (West Supp. 1979) (no ad damnum in any per-
sonal injury or wrongful death action); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-6 (Bums Supp. 1979) (ad
damnum eliminated in medical malpractice actions); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 3017(c) (McKinney Supp.
1979-80) (ad damnum eliminated in medical malpractice action). The statutes typically provide
that if an action is brought in a court with a monetary jurisdictional threshold, the pleader may
aver generally that such jurisdictional requirement has been met. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-5-4 (1978).
In states that permit the reading of a complaint to the jury, there exists the potential for
undue influence on the jury's determination of liability and damages if a large ad damnumn is
quoted. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1259, at 260
(1969). The elimination of ad damnum clauses in medical malpractice litigation is intended to
prevent such influence in particular cases and in the longrun to deflate public expectations of high
damages in malpractice actions, thereby reducing the size of jury awards. Everett v. Goldman,
359 So. 2d 1256, 1263 (La. 1978); Comment, supra note 3, at 1451-53. The HEW Report con-
cluded:
[T]he astronomical amounts of damages set forth in malpractice complaints by attorneys
are an unnecessary source of friction between the legal and medical professions. These
large demands attract sensational newspaper coverage, impose needless anxiety and
often unfounded notoriety upon defendant physicians, create a feeling of unfair persecu-
tion in the medical world and are of no special benefit to the plaintiff-patients.
HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
An interesting Erie question beyond the scope of this article is whether a state's rule against
addamnum clauses in medical malpractice complaints would be binding on a federal court in a
diversity action. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) requires the pleader to state "the relief to which he deems
himself entitled," but this may be construed as requiring simply a statement of the type of relief
sought, legal or equitable, not necessarily a particular amount of damages. 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra, § 1259, at 259. If the latter construction of the Federal Rule is followed, there
would be no conflict, leaving the federal court free to apply state law. See id Cf. R.S.E., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Supply, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 702, 703 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (Pennsylvania court rule disallow-
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Beyond the separation of screening panels into preaction and
postcommencement categories, generalization is difficult. Panels con-
sist of at least three persons, with medical professionals serving as the
principal type of panelist. Most panels, however, provide for the par-
ticipation of an attorney or judge, who serves either as a voting member
or nonvoting chairman or referee. Some panels include lay persons.3"
A mixed panel generally is viewed as the preferable model: Medical
professionals provide needed scientific expertise while lawyers provide
legal knowledge and help counterbalance any tendency by the doctors
to insulate the defendant from liability.3 Lay persons add a nonpro-
fessional viewpoint akin to that of the jury.32
Panels are administered by state courts, 33 by state departments of
insurance or public health,34 or by agencies created specially for the
purpose.35 Panelists usually are selected from lists or "pools" of local
lay persons36 and medical and legal professionals licensed within the
state.37 Some states require panelists to serve without compensation,38
but most provide for expenses and statutorily fixed fees on a per diem
basis.39 States which have provided for compensation of panelists or
have created special offices to administer panels finance such costs ei-
ther from the state's general funds, from a special fund created by an-
nual surcharges collected from all health care providers within the
ing addamnum clauses for amounts in excess of$ 10,000 held applicable in federal antitrust action
because not in conflict with Rule 8(a)(3)). On the other hand, if a square conflict is perceived, the
result is uncertain. Although the Supreme Court in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965),
suggested that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should supersede all inconsistent state rules of
procedure, an argument can be made that state rules against addamnum clauses in medical mal-
practice actions are bound up with substantive rights and therefore beyond the power of the
Supreme Court's rulemaking authority. See McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. CIM Assocs., Inc., 438 F.
Supp. 245, 248 (S.D. Fla. 1977) ("a Federal Rule cannot abridge an existing substantive right");
note 100 infra. But see 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 1259, at 259.
30. A helpful chart which breaks down the composition of panels on a state-by-state basis is
set forth as app. II in Note, supra note 7, at 351.
31. Mallor, supra note 2, at 110-113; Comment, supra note 3, at 1459.
32. Abraham, supra note 13, at 514.
33. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1979) (chiefjudge of each judicial
circuit and circuit court clerk).
34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6803-6806 (Supp. 1978) (Commissioner of Insur-
ance).
35. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-14 to -17 (1978) (Medical Review Commission).
36. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2602 to -2603 (Supp. 1979) (special administrative
agency prepares list of 12 laymen for appointment to individual panels consisting of a layman,
medical professional, and judicial referee).
37. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1979) (physician member
of panel is chosen from list submitted to court by Massachusetts Medical Society and attorney
member is chosen from list submitted by Massachusetts Bar Association).
38. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2602 (Supp. 1979).
39. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(g) (Supp. 1979) (travel expenses and per diem in
accordance with state law pertaining to members of boards and commissions); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 1301.308(e) (Purdon Supp. 1978-79) (per diem or salary basis as fixed by an administrative
board plus actual and necessary expenses); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.10 (1977) ($25 per diem plus
actual and necessary expenses).
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state, or from the litigants themselves.4 0
Most states allow the parties to engage in discovery prior to the
panel hearing, either by explicit provision for the taking of depositions
or by incorporation of all discovery rules in force in the jurisdiction.4'
Statutes generally provide that the hearing is to be informal, but the
procedures in individual states range from adversarial "trials" with
opening and closing statements, live testimony under oath, and cross-
examination of witnesses, to submissions in writing in which the parties
explain their position and provide evidentiary exhibits such as x-rays,
hospital reports, and deposition transcripts.42 Presumably, the more in-
40. Massachusetts provides an example of a state which absorbs panel expenses from general
funds. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1979) ("the expenses and compensa-
tion of said tribunal shall be paid by the commonwealth"). Tennessee is one of the states which
has created a special fund, providing for annual fees of $ 100 from each physician, $250 from each
licensed hospital with 250 or more beds, $100 from all other licensed hospitals and health care
facilities, and $50 from all other health care providers with enumerated exceptions. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 23-3421 (Supp. 1978).
There are various ways of funding panels through the parties: Imposition of the costs and
expenses of panel hearings in equal proportions on the parties, see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-
2845 (1978); imposition of such costs on the party in whose favor the panel decides, see, e.g., LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(1) (West 1977); or assessment of costs on a discretionary basis, see,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6813 (Supp. 1978). Some systems provide for panel costs to be
imposed for noncooperation with the panel, see, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671-19 (1976), or for
asserting a "frivolous" claim or denial of liability, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(g) (Supp.
1979). Rhode Island allows the state to recoup the costs of a panel if the "losing party" continues
to litigate and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment in the court proceeding. R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 10-19-9(b)-(d) (Supp. 1978).
41. Florida, for example, specifically provides for a full range of civil action discovery de-
vices. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44(5) (West Supp. 1979). The North Dakota statute, in contrast,
states only that the parties may take depositions prior to the panel hearing. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-29.1-06 (Supp. 1979). Some of the preaction statutes are silent on the issue of discovery by
the parties, but give the panel subpoena power or other authority to obtain medical records or
testimony. Nev. REv. STAT. § 41A.055(l) (1977). Hawaii is a preaction state specifically disallow-
ing discovery by the parties, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671-13 (1976), and Idaho disallows such dis-
covery except in extraordinary circumstances. IDAHO CODE § 6-1003 (1979). Unless otherwise
provided, the court-regulated reference statutes presumably contemplate the use of all available
discovery procedures. Abraham, supra note 13, at 516 n.68; Rxfor New York, supra note 2, at 491.
The Alaska reference statute, however, disallows discovery by the parties until after a panel deci-
sion has been rendered unless a party can show good cause for relaxation of such prohibition.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(0 (Supp. 1979).
42. Arizona is representative of the states adopting a "trial" approach to the hearing:
Witnesses may be called, all testimony shall be under oath, testimony may be taken
either orally before the panel or by deposition, copies of hospital and medical records,
nurses' notes, x-rays and other records kept in the usual course of the practice of the
licensed health care provider may be admitted without the necessity for other identifica-
tion or authentication, statements of facts or opinions on a subject contained in a pub-
lished treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet or statements by experts may be admitted
without the necessity of such experts appearing at said hearing, and the right to sub-
poena witnesses and evidence shall obtain as in all other proceedings in superior court.
The right of cross-examination shall obtain as to all witnesses who testify in person. The
panel may, upon application of any party or upon its own initiative, summon or sub-
poena any records or persons to substantiate or clarify any evidence which has been
presented to it and may appoint impartial and qualified health care providers to conduct
any necessary professional or expert examination of the plaintiff or any evidentiary mat-
ter and to testify as a witness.
...Both parties shall be entitled, individually and through counsel, to make opening
and closing statements. No transcript or record of the proceedings shall be required, but
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formal the proceedings, the greater will be the savings in time and liti-
gation expenses.
Although a few states allow also for a determination of damages,
the panel's decision usually is confined to the question of liability.43
The decision is never binding on the parties unless they consent to be
bound. Any person unwilling to accept the panel's decision has an op-
portunity for traditional judicial resolution. Most states simply allow
the plaintiff to file an action or continue to prosecute a pending action
without qualification if either plaintiff or defendant rejects the panel
decision.' Some states, however, make it more difficult to proceed to
trial and avoid the binding effect of the panel decision. The preaction
statute in Maryland, for example, provides that the parties are bound
by the panel decision unless one of the parties files a notice of rejection
with the panel within ninety days after the decision and fies an action
in court within the same period.45 If the panel finds for the defendant,
Massachusetts requires the plaintiff to file a security bond of $2000 for
costs and attorney's fees as a precondition to continued prosecution of
the action.46 A few states indirectly encourage acceptance of the
any party may have the proceedings transcribed or recorded at such party's own
cost....
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(D)-(E) (Supp. 1979).
Indiana's procedure is typical of the states limiting the hearing to written submissions:
The evidence to be considered by the medical review panel shall be promptly submitted
by the respective parties in written form only. The evidence may consist of medical
charts, x-rays, lab tests, excerpts of treatises, depositions of witnesses including parties
and any other form of evidence allowable by the medical review panel. .. .
* . * Either party, after submission of all evidence and upon ten [10] days' notice to the
other side, shall have the right to convene the panel at a time and place agreeable to the
members of the panel. Either party may question the panel concerning any matters rele-
vant to issues to be decided by the panel before the issuance of their report. The chair-
man of the panel shall preside at all meetings. Meetings shall be informal.
. . . The panel shall have the right and duty to request all necessary information. The
panel may consult with medical authorities. The panel may examine reports of such
other health care providers necessary to fully inform itself regarding the issue to be de-
cided. Both parties shall have full access to any material submitted to the panel.
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-9-4 to -6 (Bums Supp. 1979). The other states play numerous varia-
tions on the two themes stated in the Arizona and Indiana statutes.
43. It has been suggested that a finding on the issue of damages is helpful in reaching settle-
ment. Abraham, supra note 13, at 514-15. On the other hand, the determination of damages will
require a greater evidentiary presentation, possibly increasing the costs of the panel hearing.
Comment, supra note 3, at 1460.
44. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2606 (Supp. 1979) (litigation may be instituted if either
party rejects the preaction panel decision); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a(7) (McKinney Supp. 1978-79)
(case is remanded to regular place on calendar if no disposition is reached as result of reference
panel hearing); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3403(d) (Supp. 1978) (claimant may proceed with pending
court action within 30 days after service of reference panel's recommendation).
45. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(a)-(b) (Supp. 1979). Rhode Island re-
quires at least one of the parties to file a notice of rejection within 30 days of the decision before
the action may proceed in court. R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 10-19-9 (Supp. 1978).
46. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 197D). The judge has discretion to
lower the amount of the bond in cases of indigency. The Massachusetts bonding requirement was
upheld against federal and state constitutional challenges in Paro v. Longwood Hosp., - Mass.-,
-, 369 N.E.2d 985, 989-91 (1977), but a similar bond in Arizona was deemed violative of the state
constitution in Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 585-86, 570 P.2d 744, 753-54 (1977). Penn-
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panel's decision by requiring a party who loses both before the panel
and at trial to pay the costs and expenses of the panel, the judicial pro-
ceeding, or both.47
A majority of states allow panel decisions to be admitted into evi-
dence at subsequent jury trials.48 Admissible panel findings, however,
are never binding on the jury, and are to be given only such weight as
the jury chooses.49 In some of the states providing for admissible panel
findings, panelists may be called as witnesses by either party.50
sylvania requires the party "appealing" the panel decision to pay all "record costs of arbitration"
as a precondition to filing a court action. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.509 (Purdon Supp. 1979-
80).
47. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PPOC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(e) (Supp. 1979) (costs of the
judicial proceeding); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.509 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (all costs of arbi-
tration and trial); R.I. GEN. LAWS § I0-19-9(b)-(c) (Supp. 1978) (costs of panel, costs of defending
or prosecuting the action, and attorney's fees).
48. The following statutes provide for admissibility of the panel's findings: ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.55.536(e) (Supp. 1979); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(M) (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-19f (West Supp. 1979) (if panel is unanimous); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 681 1(c),
6812 (Supp. 1978) (after screening by court for error); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.47(2) (West Supp.
1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-9 (Burns Supp. 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(H)
(,Vest 1977); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2844(2) (1978); N.J. CIv. PRAC. R.
4:21-5(e) (1979) (if panel is unanimous); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a(8) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80) (if
panel is unanimous); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.1-02(1) (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2711.21(C) (Page Supp. 1978) (after screening by court for error); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1301.510 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-8 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §
23-3409 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1979); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 655.19(1), (2)
(West Supp. 1979) (formal panel only).
The following statutes preclude the admissibility of panel findings: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-
2609 (Supp. 1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671-16 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 6-1001 (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. § 65-4904(c) (Supp. 1978); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2807 (Supp. 1978-79); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.050 (Vernon Supp. 1979);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 17-1312(4) (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519-A:8 (1974);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §.4.1-5-20(D) (1978). The Nevada statute, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41A.010 to .097
(1977), has no provision covering admissibility.
49. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(M) (Supp. 1979) ("The jury shall be instructed
that the conclusion of the panel shall not be binding but shall be accorded such weight as they
choose to give it."). But see, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (Supp. 1979)
(panel's award is "presumed to be correct, and the burden is on the party rejecting it to prove that
it is not correct").
50. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-9 (Burns Supp. 1979) (any member of a panel com-
prised of one attorney and three health care providers may be called); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a(8)(McKinney Supp. 1979-80) (if finding of panel comprised of a judge, lawyer, and doctor is unani-
mous, and therefore admissible, the lawyer and doctor may be called). In effect, the parties are
assured of live expert testimony, which can be especially helpful to plaintiffs who encounter the
so-called "conspiracy of silence," in which physicians refrain from testifying against their col-
leagues. Comment, supra note 3, at 1462. Some states disallowing panelists from participating in
the trial nevertheless provide assistance to plaintiffs who prevailed before the panel in obtaining
other expert medical testimony for the trial. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(J) (Supp.
1979). Illinois provides the same assistance for either party who accepts the panel's decision. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). Ohio permits the panelists to be called
for cross-examination by the party who rejects the panel decision, OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2711.21(D) (Page Supp. 1978), and Rhode Island allows the parties to call any expert who was
consulted by the panelists. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-8 (Supp. 1978).
It has been suggested that a more accurate result is reached by the panel if the panelists know
they may be called upon to testify in court at a subsequent trial. Mallor, supra note 2, at 11. On
the other hand, two courts have suggested that the calling of a panelist to testify on the party's
behalf "bolsters" the panel decision, perhaps unduly influencing the jury. Eastin v. Broomfield,
116 Ariz. 576, 581, 570 P.2d 744, 749 (1977); Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 524-25, 261
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Proponents of admissibility argue that it is necessary to give teeth
to the screening process. The litigant who is disappointed by an ad-
verse panel finding has no incentive to settle if he knows that the jury
will not be made aware of the panel's expert opinion.5 If the parties
know that the finding is admissible, they will take the screening proce-
dures seriously and prepare thoroughly for the panel hearing, hopefully
producing an accurate result. 2 Proponents also argue that the panel's
decision is helpful to the jury in the fact-finding process.53 On the other
hand, opponents of admissibility contend that the panel's finding could
strongly influence the jury, substantially benefitting the party in whose
favor the decision was rendered. 4 An inaccurate or unjust panel deci-
sion might be carried over into a judgment if the jury is hesitant to
reach a contrary conclusion.
Screening panels of the type employed by the states for medical
malpractice claims have not been adopted by Congress or its rulemak-
ing delegate, the Supreme Court, for use in federal district courts.
When a federal court sitting in a state with a preaction panel require-
ment is presented with a malpractice claim by a plaintiff who has not
gone before the panel, the defendant is likely to move for dismissal of
the action for failure to satisfy a condition precedent or to state a claim.
A similar motion requesting reference of the claim to a panel after the
federal action has been commenced might be made if the court is lo-
cated in a state which provides for postcommencement screening.
Whether such motions should be granted depends upon a proper inter-
pretation of Erie.56 At a subsequent trial, Erie, together with the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and the seventh amendment, must be
N.W.2d 434, 450 (1978). This threat would seem to be neutralized by the adversary party's oppor-
tunity for cross-examination.
51. Redish, supra note 7, at 767 n.55; Comment, supra note 3, at 1461-62.
52. Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 121-24, 394 A.2d 932, 940-41 (1978); Note, supra
note 7, at 347.
53. Rxfor New York, supra note 2, at 498.
54. Abraham, supra note 13, at 515; Note, Ohio's Rxfor the Medical Malpractice Crisis: The
Patient Pays, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 90, 102 (1976); Note, supra note 20, at 1303-04.
There is an apparent discrepancy among New York attorneys concerning the effect on juries
of unanimous decisions rendered by New York panels, each of which is comprised of a doctor,
lawyer, and a judge. Representatives of the plaintiffs' bar complain that a finding in defendant's
favor makes it substantially more difficult to win a case at trial. Fuchsberg & Turkewitz, Coping
with Medical Malpractice Panels, N.Y.L.J., June 20, 1979, at 1. Attorneys for the medical profes-
sion, on the contrary, have stated that a finding in defendant's favor has little effect because the
jury believes the doctor member of the panel undoubtedly was biased, whereas a finding for plain-
tiff carries great weight because the doctor member voted against a colleague. Bard & Krevitsky,
A Review of Medical Malpractice Mediation, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 26, 1979, at 4.
55. Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 226 (D.R.I. 1978); Recent Medical Malpractice
Legislation, supra note 2, at 681.
56. Regardless of Erie, the seventh amendment would prevent the granting of such motions if
the court accepts the argument that screening panels impermissibly delay a party's access to a
federal jury trial. This issue is considered in Section IV infra.
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considered in connection with the question whether panel findings
should be introduced into evidence.
The Erie problem is troublesome because the Supreme Court has
not provided a definitive test for determining when to apply state laws
intended to advance both procedural and substantive goals. 7 Screen-
ing panels fall within this category because they seek to affect both pro-
cedural and substantive aspects of medical malpractice disputes. One
of the procedural purposes of a screening panel is to enhance the over-
all efficiency of the medical malpractice adjudicative process by keep-
ing malpractice claims out of court, reducing the size of court dockets,
and minimizing the parties' litigation costs. Screening panels also serve
to manage litigation by facilitating the opportunity for settlement at an
early stage of the dispute. In this regard, the screening process has been
likened to a pretrial settlement conference with a judge . 8
The substantive purposes furthered by a screening panel relate
both to individual cases and to medical malpractice generally. The
existence of a panel will influence the conduct of the plaintiff and his
attorney in determining whether to bring a claim that is factually or
legally weak, since they know it might be "screened out" prior to trial
by the panel. As a result, the potential defendant is given a measure of
protection from a frivolous claim at the outset. Assuming a claim is
asserted, the panel will influence both plaintiff and defendant in decid-
ing whether to pursue the litigation further or to settle. Screening
panels are also intended to affect conduct beyond that of the parties in
individual cases. By reducing the number of medical malpractice
claims that make it to trial, thus reducing publicity, screening panels
may help discourage the frequency of other litigation. The fewer
number of publicized jury verdicts may also help to dispel beliefs
among future jurors that high damage awards are common in medical
57. The difference between "procedural" and "substantive" rules is often difficult to perceive.
Generally, procedural rules are the "incidents of adjudication" regulating "the decisional forms"
by which substantive rights and obligations are enforced. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE I (2d ed. 1977). Procedural rules have also been defined as rules "designed to make the
process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes," Ely, The rre-
pressibleMyth ofErie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974), and as "law regulating merely the course
of litigation." McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer, The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884,
888 n.18 (1965). Examples include rules designed to elicit truth, to regulate the manner in which
adversaries present their cases, or to promote efficiency of the process. Ely, supra, at 724-25,
Substantive law, on the other hand, is concerned generally with regulation of human conduct
and relationships---"the activity which gives rise to litigation and the fruits thereof." McCoid,
supra, at 888 n.18; see Ely, supra, at 725-26. In differentiating procedure and substance in an Erie
context, rules should be examined from the viewpoint of the purposes they are intended to serve,
since many laws can have both procedural and substantive effects Id at 724 n.170; McCoid,
supra, at 888 n.18. Some laws serve both procedural and substantive purposes, regulating not
only the management of litigation but also human activity peripheral to the litigation. See Ely,
supra, at 726.
58. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 807 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
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malpractice cases. The ultimate goal of screening panels, along with
other legislative responses to the medical malpractice crisis, is to influ-
ence the insurance industry's rate-setting decisions, specifically, to keep
insurance premiums down.59
Screening panels, therefore, are neither exclusively procedural nor
substantive. In order to determine the extent to which screening panels
are applicable in federal diversity actions, it is necessary first to identify
a proper standard for dealing with laws which serve such dual func-
tions.
II. DISCERNING A PROPER TEST FOR RESOLVING ERIE PROBLEMS
The starting point for inquiry into the applicability of state law in
federal diversity actions6" is the Rules of Decision Act: "The laws of
the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply."' 6' The evolution of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act should be familiar to all students of
civil procedure.
From 1842 until 1938, the phrase "laws of the several states" was
limited by the decision in Swift v. Tyson 62 to mean statutory law of the
states and state decisional law to the extent it involved "rights and titles
to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to
real estate."'63 Federal diversity courts were not required to apply the
state's decisional law on matters involving the "general" common law
and were left free to perceive for themselves an appropriate rule of
law.64
All of this changed with the Court's decision in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,65 in which Swift was overruled. Justice Brandeis, author of
59. See note 4 supra. The cost of insurance premiums affects decisions by medical profes-
sionals regarding the locality in which they will practice and the specialties they will pursue, and
also affects the prices paid by the public for health care services. See note 2 supra.
60. Although the question of the applicability of state law in the federal courts arises most
frequently in cases where jurisdiction is premised on diversity of citizenship between the parties,
the issue can also arise where the court's jurisdiction is founded on a claim arising under federal
law, as for example, in the case of a state claim adjudicated pursuant to the doctrine of pendentjurisdiction. See Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540-41 n.l
(2d Cir. 1956) (Erie doctrine applies to all issues or claims having their source in state law, regard-
less of the ground for federal jurisdiction) (dictum); 1A, pt. 2 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL,
& J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.305[3] (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
62. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
63. Id at 18.
64. Id at 18-19. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS § 54 (3d ed. 1976).
65. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). An illuminating and entertaining account of the dynamics of the Erie
litigation is contained in Younger, What Happenedin Erie, 56 TEX. L. REv. 1011 (1978).
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the Erie opinion, gave three reasons why the "laws of the several
states" should be interpreted to encompass all state law, whether "de-
clared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a deci-
sion":66 (1) The Rules of Decision Act had been misinterpreted by the
Sw/? Court;67 (2) the Swi doctrine had produced "mischievous re-
sults," allowing parties of diverse citizenship to bring a case to federal
court where a "general" common law rule at odds with the common
law rule prevailing under the applicable state law might be applied,
creating problems of equal protection for nondiverse parties compelled
to litigate in state courts;68 and (3) the Swift doctrine was "unconstitu-
tional," since neither Congress nor the federal courts have the power
"to declare substantive rules of common law." 69 In Erie, this meant
that, in order to determine the standard of care owed by the Erie Rail-
road to Mr. Tompkins, the federal district court was compelled to apply
the common law rules of Pennsylvania, not the "federal common
law."
70
The validity and scope of the Court's third ground has been a sub-
ject of scholarly debate." The constitutional wing of the opinion seems
66. 304 U.S. at 78.
67. Id at 72-73. The research of Professor Charles Warren had "established" that the phrase
"laws of the several states" was intended by the draftsmen of the Rules of Decision Act as a
shorthand expression for all laws of the states, whether embodied in statutes or judicial decisions.
See Warren, New Light on the History ofthe Federal Judiciary Act of1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49,
81-88 (1923). Judge Friendly questions whether Professor Warren's analysis and conclusions were
definitive. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
383, 389-90 (1964).
68. 304 U.S. at 74-75. The Court observed that one of the goals underlying Sw/?t had been to
achieve uniformity of law among federal courts. Id at 74. The states, however, persisted in ap-
plying their own views of the common law. As a result, a party able to take his case to federal
court because of diversity of citizenship might be able to obtain the advantage of a rule of law
different from that applied in state courts. This "introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens
against citizens," rendering "impossible equal protection of the law." Id at 74-75. The resulting
lack of uniformity between federal and state courts in adjudicating similar claims produced "in-
justice and confusion." Id at 77.
69. Id at 78-79. The Court did not specify which particular clause of the Constitution was
violated, although the tenth amendment comes to mind. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 64, § 56, at
259; Stason, Choice of Law Within the Federal System, Erie Versus Hanna, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 377,
393-94 (1967). It was said that the Constitution "recognizes and preserves the autonomy and
independence of the States-independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial
departments," 304 U.S. at 78-79, and that the federal courts (including "this Court") had invaded
"rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States.' Id at 80.
70. Id
71. Seegeneraly C. WRIGHT, supra note 64, § 56. Some have argued that the Court's discus-
sion of the constitutional issue was dictum. See, e.g., IA, pt. 2 MOORE, supra note 60, 0.304;
Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence ofErie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE
L.J. 267, 278 (1946). In his concurring opinion in Erie, Justice Reed stated that the Court's decla-
rations with respect to the unconstitutionality of the Sw/ft doctrine were "unnecessary," and ques-
tioned the conclusion that Congress would be without power to declare rules of substantive law to
govern federal courts. 304 U.S. at 91. Several years later, Justice Rutledge expressed the same
sentiment in his dissenting opinion in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
He accepted Erie's holding with respect to prohibiting the federal judiciary from determining
matters of substantive common law as "a wise rule of administration" but had "grave doubt that it
has any solid constitutional foundation." Id at 558. Others have contended that the constitu-
tional branch of the Erie opinion was an essential component. See Friendly, supra note 67, at
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sound as applied to cases such as Erie, that involve general substantive
lawmaking by the federal judiciary without specific constitutional au-
thorization.72 The extent to which the Constitution may require federal
courts to adhere to state law in matters that are procedural in nature is
less certain.73 Opinions subsequent to Erie have focused not on the
constitutional limitations on federal courts, but rather on the limita-
tions imposed by the Rules of Decision Act, which are to be gleaned
from the "policy" underlying Erie.74 This policy appears to be a con-
cern for the accommodation of state and federal law in dual court sys-
tems in accordance with general principles of federalism.75 The
385-86; Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity
Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 189-90 (1957).
The Supreme Court itself, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956),
suggested in dictum that Erie was constitutionally based. The Court stated that if congressional
legislation were to make private arbitration agreements enforceable in federal diversity actions,
absent the necessary ingredient of interstate commerce, "a constitutional question might be
presented. Erie ... indicated that Congress does not have the constitutional authority to make
the law that is applicable to controversies in diversity of citizenship cases." Id at 202.
Professor John Hart Ely maintains that the correct analysis for any inquiry into congressional
power to prescribe rules of law in federal courts should be premised on the Constitution itself, not
Erie's pronouncements concerning the reserved powers of the states. Ely, supra note 57, at 700-06.
Congressional legislation should be measured solely against the enumerated areas of federal legis-
lative competence set forth in the Constitution. Id at 701-04. With respect to matters that can be
classified as either substantive or procedural, article III and the necessary and proper clause pro-
vide sufficient authority for congressional regulation of law in diversity courts. Id at 706. In the
absence of such an area of authority granted by the Constitution, Congress is incompetent, and
state law, therefore, can be the only applicable law. Id at 701-02. Professor Ely's position is
based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965). Under
this analysis, Erie was correctly decided since nothing in the Constitution gives federal courts
general lawmaking authority in diversity actions. Ely, supra note 57, at 703.
72. C. WRIGHT, supra note 64, § 56, at 261; Ely, supra note 57, at 703.
73. Mr. Justice Reed noted in Erie that "no one doubts federal power over procedure." 304
U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring). See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559
(1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is Congress which has the power to govern the procedure of
the federal courts in diversity cases, and the states which have that power over matters clearly
substantive in nature."). The line between substance and procedure is not always easy to draw, as
the subsequent history of Erie has demonstrated.
74. Subsequent to Erie, none of the three major Supreme Court opinions concerning the
Rules of Decision Act, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), has spoken of
constitutional prerogatives. See McCoid, supra note 57, at 890. For example, in Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the Court stated that "the message of York ... is that choices
between state and federal law are to be made. . . by reference to the policies underlying the Erie
rule." Id at 467 (emphasis added). The Hanna Court then defined the test for Rules of Decision
Act cases in terms of compliance with "the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." Id at 468.
In all three cases, the state rules at issue were not "clearly substantive" as was the situation in
Erie. Each had a procedural aspect. As to these rules, the Court said nothing about any constitu-
tional compulsion that state law be followed-merely that a "policy" of Erie should be examined
to determine whether compliance is required. See id at 467-68; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536-38 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101, 109 (1945).
75. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965),
described Erie as "one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that
profoundly touch the allocation ofjudicial power between the state and federal systems." See also
note 74 supra.
In Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 1976), the court
summarized the federalism principle of Erie as follows: "[C]ertainly a concern for states' policies
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subsequent history of Erie has involved an effort to fashion an appro-
priate standard for implementing this policy.
In the immediate aftermath of Erie, it appeared that in diversity
actions federal courts were to apply state law to matters of "substance"
and federal law to matters of "procedure."76 Such a view led to
problems of characterization. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,77 the
Court eschewed a purely substance versus procedure analysis and de-
veloped an "outcome-determinative" test: "[T]he outcome of the litiga-
tion in the federal court should be substantially the same . ..as it
would be if tried in a State Court."78 Federal courts trying diversity
claims were said to be "in effect, only another court of the State."'79
There is no need to determine whether a state rule is procedural or
substantive; the federal district court must merely determine whether
disregard of such law would "substantially affect the enforcement of
the right" being sued upon. 0 Thus, a state statute of limitations that
could "completely bar recovery" on a state-based claim if brought in a
state court likewise had to be applied by the federal court.8"
As exemplified by three decisions handed down by the Supreme
and prerogatives can never be out of place in a system of coordinate sovereignties-as a matter of
prudence and comity if not as a matter of constitutional law."
76. C. WRIGHT, supra note 64, § 59, at 272; Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey, & Day, Wear' Erie, 34
CORNELL L.Q. 494, 506-07 (1949). The Supreme Court appears to have applied this test in Cities
Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939), which held that an evidentiary issue of burden
of proof was so "relateid] to a substantial right" as to require application of state law. It has been
noted that the Erie opinion itself establishes no such dichotomy between substance and procedure
as a definitive test for Rules of Decision Act problems. Ely, supra note 57, at 708. Justice Bran-
deis' opinion says only that federal courts cannot declare ".substantive rules of common law." 304
U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). It is Justice Reed's concurring opinion which reaffirms federal
power over procedure. Id at 92. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465, 471 (1965) (Erie says
"roughly" that federal courts should apply state substantive law and federal procedural law).
Professor McCoid maintains that the substance-procedure distinction is still the appropriate
test: "The difficulty of the inquiry [distinguishing substance and procedure] ... does not justify
its avoidance; it is necessary for precisely the reasons stated in Erie." McCoid, supra note 57, at
888. Justice Rutledge expressed the same view in his dissenting opinion in Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949):
The accepted dichotomy is the familiar "procedural-substantive" one. This ofcourse is a
subject of endless discussion, which hardly needs to be repeated here. Suffice it to say
that actually in many situations procedure and substance are so interwoven that rational
separation becomes well-nigh impossible. But, even so, this fact cannot dispense with
the necessity of making a distinction.
77. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
78. Id at 109. The York test has been described as a "mirror image" approach. Meador,
State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1090 (1963).
79. 326 U.S. at 108.
80. Id. at 108-09.
81. Id at 110. The issue in York was whether plaintiff's claim was barred by a state statute
of limitations. The lower federal appellate court had been persuaded that since plaintiff's claim
was equitable in nature, the district court in its administration of equitable remedies was free to
ignore state law. Id at 100-'01. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the
rights and obligations at issue were created by state law, and that this should be the decisive
factor. Id at 112. Recognizing that the "forms and mode" of enforcing an equitable right may
occasionally vary depending on whether suit is brought in state or federal court, the federal court
nevertheless cannot grant recovery where the state would not. Id at 108-09.
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Court on the same day in 1949-Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Ware-
house Co. ,8 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. , and Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp. 84-the outcome-determinative test proved ex-
tremely deferential toward state rules arguably procedural in nature.
In Ragan, the Court held that a federal court must apply the method
specified by state law for the tolling of the statute of limitations.85 In
Woods, it was held that a federal court must apply a state "door-clos-
ing" statute which barred foreign corporations from suing in state
courts if they were doing business in the forum without having com-
plied with statutory qualification procedures.86 Finally, Cohen held ap-
82. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
83. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
84. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
85. 337 U.S. at 533. The plaintiff in Ragan filed his complaint in a federal district court in
Kansas prior to expiration of the statute of limitations. Id at 531. Process was not delivered by
the United States Marshall to the defendant, however, until several weeks after the statute had
expired. Id The applicable law of Kansas provided that the statute of limitations was not tolled
until service of process. Id Although a Kansas court would have dismissed the action as barred,
plaintiff argued that he had properly "commenced" his action within the meaning of Rule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by filing the complaint in court and that this should be deemed a
toll of the statute. Id at 532-33. The Court held that since the claim was based on state law, the
"measure" of the claim must be found in state law: "It accrues and comes to an end when local
law so declares." Id at 533. The Court felt that Erie would be violated if "longer life" were given
to the claim in federal court than it would have received in state court. Id at 533-34.
Ragan seemed to present a square conflict between a state rule and a specific Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure. Some authorities hold that Ragan was inferentially overruled by the decision in
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), which seemed to give supremacy to any Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure which squarely conflicts with a state rule. See, e.g., Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799,
801-02 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398
F.2d 598, 604-06 (2d Cir. 1968); 2 MOORE, supra note 60, 3.07 [4.-3-1]. Others contend that
Ragan is consistent with Hanna, either because FED. R. Civ. P. 3 does not cover the subject of
tolling the statute of limitations or, assuming it does, the federal rule cannot supersede a state rule
specifying the event which tolls the statute if the rule is intimately connected with a substantive
goal. See Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir. 1971) (Ragan still applicable); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 64, § 59, at 277; Ely, supra note 57, at 729-32. Cf. Prashar v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947, 954 (8th Cir. 1973) (Ragan not necessarily overruled by Hanna, but
in case at bar state provision for "commencement' of action by serving process was not "intrinsi-
cally related to the rights flowing from the statute of limitations"). The Supreme Court itself in
Hanna distinguished Ragan on the grounds that the latter involved a complete bar to recovery,
380 U.S. at 469 n.10, and suggested that FED. R. Civ. P. 3 was not so broad as to encompass the
question of tolling the statute of limitations. Id at 470. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, stated
in his concurring opinion that Ragan was "wrong." 380 U.S. at 477. In a recent case involving a
similar statute, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari. See Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3217 (Oct. 2, 1979).
86. 337 U.S. at 538. A "door-closing" statute is one which does not relate to the underlying
merits of the plaintiffs claim but merely prevents its enforcement for some extrinsic reason. See
Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 427, 568 (1958); Meador, supra
note 78, at 1092. The Mississippi provision at issue in Woods required foreign corporations doing
business in Mississippi to file with the state the name of a designated agent upon whom process
could be served. 337 U.S. at 535-36. Failure to comply with the provision would result in forfei-
ture of the right to bring or maintain an action in 9tate court. Id at 536 n.l.
The Court held the Mississippi statute applicable in federal district court on the authority of
its earlier decision in Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). Angel involved a North Carolina
statute which disallowed suits against debtors on deficiencies from prior mortgage foreclosure
proceedings. Id at 185. The plaintiff in Angel brought suit against a debtor in a North Carolina
court on a deficiency judgment obtained in Virginia only to have the case dismissed by the North
Carolina state courts. Id at 184-85. Plaintiff thereafter attempted to sue the debtor for the defi-
ciency in a North Carolina federal district court. Id at 185. The Supreme Court held that the
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plicable in federal court a state law requiring certain plaintiffs in
corporate shareholder derivative actions to post a security bond for
costs and attorney's fees as a precondition to prosecution of the ac-
tion.87
The state laws at issue in the foregoing cases had the earmarks of
procedural rules; clearly they did not constitute the rights or obligations
underlying the claims or defenses being asserted by the parties. On the
other hand, like the statute of limitations in York, the rules would have
a substantial impact on the ability to enforce state-created rights and
obligations and therefore were outcome-determinative. The keystone
of the Erie policy seemed to be uniformity of result between federal
and state courts with respect to the same litigated matters. This ap-
proach, if carried to an extreme, would require the application of any
and all state procedural rules, no matter how unrelated to substantive
rights and relations between the parties.88
This was not to be, however, for in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec-
tric Cooperative, Inc. ,89 the Court indicated that the test of outcome de-
termination was subject to qualification. Byrd involved a rule under
South Carolina law which required the judge, in a negligence action by
an injured workman, to decide as a matter of law whether under the
workmen's compensation statute the plaintiff was an employee of the
defendant, thereby immunizing the defendant from an action at law.9"
action was barred by res judicata and apparently because Erie mandated the following of "State
law and policy." Id at 191-92. In Woods the Court held that the Erie branch of Angel was not
dictum: "[T]he policy of Erie. . .precluded maintenance in the federal court in diversity cases of
suits to which the State had closed its doors." 337 U.S. at 537.
87. 337 U.S. at 555-57. The law in question was a New Jersey statute requiring stockholders
with small holdings to post an indemnity bond for expenses and attorney's fees for which plaintiff
would be liable in the event the action was terminated in defendant's favor. Id at 543-45. The
Court viewed the statute as having created "a new liability where none existed before," the en-
forcement of which was insured through the bonding requirement. Id at 555-56. The Court held
that "a statute which so conditions the stockholder's action [cannot] be disregarded by the federal
court as a mere procedural device." Id at 556. The Court saw no conflict with FED. R.Civ. P. 23,
which governs shareholder derivative actions but which is silent on the issue of plaintif's liability
for litigation expenses. Id
Justice Douglas, in dissent, took the position that FED. R. Civ. P. 23 alone defines the proce-
dure for stockholder derivative suits in federal court. Id at 557. Justice Douglas maintained that
the Erie principle does not require application of state rules which "merely prescribe the method"
by which suits are instituted: State rules "do not fall under the principle of Erie . . . unless they
define, qualify or delimit the cause of action or otherwise relate to it.' Id
Justice Rutledge's separate dissenting opinion took the position that the outcome-determina-
tive test was an improper gloss on Erie and that the proper test should be one which differentiates
substance from procedure. Id at 558-59. The New Jersey bonding requirement, in his view, was
"too close to controlling the incidents of the litigation rather than its outcome to be identified" as a
rule of substance. Id at 560.
88. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 64, §§ 55, 59, at 256-57, 273. After Ragan, Woods, and Co-
hen some observers feared the outcome-determinative test would eviscerate the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, since any time a state rule of procedure varied from one of the Federal Rules, a
different outcome would be the result of noncompliance with the state rule, thereby mandating
application of state law. See id; Meador, supra note 78, at 1097-98.
89. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
90. Id at 527, 533-34.
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Such a question in federal court, on the other hand, was one of fact for
the jury's decision.91 The Supreme Court held that the federal district
court should submit the question to the jury, even though this might
produce a different result from that which would be reached in the state
court.9 2
The Court applied a new two-part test in reaching this conclusion.
First, the South Carolina rule should be examined to see whether it was
"bound up" with the rights and obligations arising out of the relation-
ship between the parties as established by the statute, implying that an
affirmative answer would mandate application of the state rule.93 In
this case the Court found that the rule was not an integral part of the
substantive relations; it concerned "merely a form and mode of enforc-
ing the immunity."9 4 Second, the Court focused on whether nonrecog-
nition of the state rule would produce a different outcome from that of
the state court. Outcome, however, was not to be the sole criterion:
account must be taken of "affirmative countervailing considerations."95
The Court declared that "[t]he federal system is an independent system
for administering justice," and that an essential characteristic of that
system is the manner in which trial functions are distributed between
judge and jury "under the influence-if not the command---of the Sev-
enth Amendment." 96 The "strong federal policy" governing the jury's
role as arbiter of all disputed fact questions was deemed to outweigh
the Erie policy of uniformity of result.97
Thus, Byrd formulated a balancing test in which federal courts
could forego the objective of identical outcomes if the state rule was not
bound up with substantive rights and obligations, and considerations of
"federal policy" outweighed an apparent presumption favoring appli-
cation of state law. This, however, was not to be the last pronounce-
ment of the Court on the Rules of Decision Act.
In Hanna v. Plumer,98 the Court was faced with a direct conflict
between Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing
service of process on the defendant by delivery to a person of suitable
age and discretion residing at the defendant's home, and a more restric-
91. Id at 537.
92. Id at 538.
93. Id at 535-36.
94. Id at 536.
95. Id at 537.
96. Id
97. Id at 538-39. As an additional basis for its holding that federal jury trial procedures
should govern, the Court opined that there was no certainty that federal procedures would pro-
duce a different outcome. Id at 540. This aspect of the Court's opinion has been criticized as
unrealistic and inconsistent with the earlier section of the opinion. Whicher, The Erie Doctrine and
the Seventh Amendment. A Suggested Resolution of Their Conflict, 37 TEX. L. REv. 549, 560
(1959).
98. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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tive rule under Massachusetts law requiring process to be delivered
personally to the executor in actions against estates. 99 The major thrust
of the decision was to free the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from
the tests developed by the Erie line of cases construing the Rules of
Decision Act. The Court held that the applicability of one of the Fed-
eral Rules, in the face of a contrary state rule, is to be tested under the
Rules Enabling Act.' 0
In what Professor John Hart Ely terms a "considered dictum,"''
however, the Hanna Court stated that Federal Rule 4(d)(1) would have
prevailed even under a Rules of Decision Act analysis.' 2 The Court
relied upon the outcome-determinative test, but cited Byrd for the
proposition that this test is not to be a "talisman."'0" The Court did not
rely upon Byrd's concept of "countervailing" federal considerations.
Rather, courts should ascertain whether the outcome would be so sub-
stantially different as to (1) encourage forum shopping by the party
entitled to take his case to federal court and (2) result in the unequal
administration of the laws.'04 Elimination of these two evils were the
"twin aims of Erie."' 5 Accordingly, the outcome test should be ap-
plied only to the extent necessary to discourage a litigant from shop-
99. Id at 461.
100. Id at 469-71. The Enabling Act provides in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district
courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions ....
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve
the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
Some critics of Hanna maintain that in extricating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from
an Erie analysis, the Court went too far towards elevating the Federal Rules over conflicting state
rules that may bear on substantive rights. See McCoid, supra note 57, at 901-03, 915; Stason,
supra note 69, at 384-91. Professor Ely points out that the Rules Enabling Act itself, in the second
sentence, prohibits incursions by the rulemakers into areas of "substance," and argues that this
should serve as an adequate check on the Federal Rules. Ely, supra note 57, at 718-23. Professor
McCoid has also noted the explicit limitation of the Enabling Act's second sentence, but views the
Rules of Decision Act as an additional check on the Federal Rules to prevent derogation of state
substantive law. McCoid, supra note 57, at 901-03.
101. Ely, supra note 57, at 710; See Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 313 (6th Cir. 1974) (Hanna
decision rested on the Rules Enabling Act, but Supreme Court "went out of its way" to show that
a proper outcome-determination analysis would result in application of the Federal Rule).
102. 380 U.S. at 465-69.
103. Id at 466-67.
104. Id at 468.
105. Id Justice Harlan concurred in the Court's holding with respect to the applicability of
FED. R. Ctv. P. 4(d)(1), but he accepted neither the majority's apparent deference to the inviola-
bility of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor its formulation of the twin-aims approach to the
outcome-determinative test. He found in Erie a command that federal courts are bound by any
state law, whether substantive or procedural, if it governs "primary private activity." Id at 475.
Thus, in deciding conflicts between state and federal law (even if the federal law is one of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), a court should inquire whether the law "would substantially
affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to
state regulation." Id Under this analysis, Justice Harlan concluded that FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)
could be applied since the conflicting Massachusetts rule played an insignificant role in state regu-
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ping for a federal forum to avoid a state rule that would have a
substantial impact on the right to recover and to prevent unfairness to
litigants of the state unable to take the same claim to federal court be-
cause of the absence of diversity. t 6
Professor Ely contends that Hanna put to rest any notion that the
appropriate test for Rules of Decision Act problems is the balancing of
state laws against possible "affirmative countervailing considerations"
of federal policy.0 7 It is his position that the sole test is that of out-
come determination as "rejuvenated" by the Hanna Court, with its
twin qualifications concerning forum shopping and the unfairness of
applying separate bodies of law when similar litigation arises between
diverse adversaries and nondiverse adversaries. 0 8
Many lower federal courts subsequent to Hanna, however, either
missed the point of Hanna or do not agree with Professor Ely. For
lation of estate administration and therefore had no substantial connection with the regulation of
a primary stage of private activity. Id at 478.
Justice Harlan believed that the Court's prior decision in Ragan with respect to the event
which tolls the statute of limitations was "wrong" under his analysis, but that its decision in Cohen
was correct since the bonding prerequisite to a stockholder's derivative action is intended to in-
hibit the bringing of "strike suits" and therefore regulates primary private activity. Id at 477-78.
No other Justice concurred in Justice Harlan's opinion. A recent student note, however, proposes
an extended application of Justice Harlan's test. Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The
Rules of Decision Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 678, 694-700 (1976).
106. It has been observed that Erie's "twin aims" express essentially a single concern for the
unfairness which results when a litigant of diverse citizenship obtains recovery or avoids a burden-
some state procedure in federal court while a nondiverse litigant is constrained by the limitations
and burdens imposed in state court. See Ely, supra note 57, at 712; McCoid, supra note 57, at 889.
There is nothing particularly evil about "shopping" for a federal forum if the desire is to obtain
the benefits of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as the liberal provisions for pretrial
discovery, see Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.- A Projection, 48 IOwA L. REv. 248, 261-62 (1963), or
the putative raison d'etre of diversity jurisdiction: the avoidance of local bias in state courts. See
Ely, supra note 57, at 713; McCoid, supra note 57, at 889. But see note 5 supra. Professor McCoid
suggests that the unfairness branch of the Hanna twin-aims test comes closer to the essence of
Erie's policy of uniformity than does the forum shopping concern. He argues that Hanna did not
really retain the outcome-determinative test, but rather returned to a substance-procedure analy-
sis, whereby Erie's policy of uniformity is narrowed "to uniformity of substantive law between the
federal and state courts." McCoid, supra note 57, at 898. See note 76 supra. Under such an
approach, "impairment of litigants' substantive rights is the only kind of inequity which really
justifies requiring application of state law in lieu of a fair federal law." McCoid, supra note 57, at
896. This analysis "satisfactorily" explains the prior decisions of York, Angel, Ragan, Woods and
Cohen, see text & notes 77-87 supra, since the state laws at issue in all of these cases arguably had
substantive purposes. McCoid, supra note 57, at 891-94.
107. Ely, supra note 57, at 717n.130.
108. Id at 7 17-18. Professor Ely's arguments are set forth as part of an overall framework for
analyzing whether proper authority exists for the application of federal law in derogation of state
law in diversity actions: (1) If the question is one of congressional power to promulgate legislation
affecting the enforcement of rights in diversity actions, the sole reference point should be the
Constitution, specifically, whether one of the enumerated powers of Congress provides authority
for the legislation, see note 71 supra; (2) if the question concerns the validity and scope of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the sole reference point should be the Rules Enabling Act, see
Ely, supra note 57, at 698, 718-38; and (3) if the question concerns a conflict between state and
federal law and there is no federal legislation or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure on point, the
Rules of Decision Act as construed in Hanna should be the point of reference. Thus, Professor
Ely's thesis is that Erie should not be viewed as an all-encompassing doctrine limiting the devel-
opment of federal legislation governing rules of law for application in federal diversity actions.
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example, in Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,"9 the Fourth Circuit de-
veloped a tripartite test conceivably consistent with Hanna, but based
primarily on Byrd's balancing approach: (1) If the state law at issue is
the substantive right or obligation being asserted, such law must be ap-
plied; (2) if the state law at issue is a procedural rule intimately bound
up with the substantive rights or obligations being asserted, such law is
likewise controlling; and (3) if the state law at issue is a procedural rule
not intimately bound up with the substantive rights or obligations be-
ing asserted, yet its application could substantially affect the outcome
of the litigation, the state law should be applied unless there are coun-
tervailing federal considerations. 10
The test was applied in Szantay to reject a South Carolina door-
closing statute that disallowed actions in state courts by nonresidents
against foreign corporations with respect to claims arising outside the
state."' The court concluded that the South Carolina rule was proce-
dural in nature and was not intimately bound up with the rights being
asserted." 1 Applying the third branch of the test, the court found that
the rule was devoid of any significant state policies aside from procedu-
ral interests in the doctrine offorum non conveniens and the reduction
of court congestion.' '3 The countervailing federal considerations were:
The constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction, which frees nonresi-
dents from local discrimination or bias; the policy underlying the full
faith and credit clause, which insures maximum enforcement of out-of-
state claims; and the federal policy favoring joinder of multiple parties
in one action, which apparently could be achieved in this case only in
an action in South Carolina." 4
The Szantay test has been followed in the Fourth Circuit"15 and
109. 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
110. Id at 63-64.
I 11. Id at 62-63.
112. Id at 64.
113. Id at 65.
114. Id at 65-66. The plaintiffs in Szantay were Illinois citizens asserting wrongful death
actions arising out of an airplane accident which occurred in Tennessee. The defendants were a
South Carolina corporation and a Delaware corporation that had an agent for service of process
in South Carolina. The court found that the South Carolina corporation could be served only in
that state. Id at 66.
The Supreme Court decisions in Angel and Woods, see note 86 supra, were distinguished on
the grounds that the state provisions at issue in those cases involved "clear state policies" designed
to effectuate state regulatory concerns. 349 F.2d at 66. The Szantaj, court paid lip service to
Hanna by noting that the different outcome here would not be unfair to South Carolina citizen-
plaintiffs, who had the capacity to sue nonresidents with respect to out-of-state claims in state
courts. On the contrary, the federal court would be avoiding discrimination against nonresidents
by providing a forum and thereby putting nonresidents on equal footing with residents. Id at 64.
115. In Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 535-38 (4th Cir. 1970), the tripartite analy-
sis was applied to a Virginia state rule of law which provided that the commencement of an action
in one state court of Virginia would not serve as a toll of the statute of limitations if the plaintiff
thereafter wished to commence an action on the same claim against the same defendant in a
separate court. The Atkins court rejected Virginia's rule, holding that an action commenced in a
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has been adopted by the Sixth' 16 and Second Circuits, the latter having
described the test as "thorough."" 7 Although the tripartite analysis in-
cludes no specific reference to the twin aims of Erie as articulated in
Hanna, the test appears to be consistent with Hanna. Under the first
two branches of Szantay, uniformity of result is maintained between
state and federal litigants with respect to substantive and quasi-sub-
stantive matters. Clearly this prevents forum shopping and unequal
administration of the laws. The third branch of the test preserves uni-
formity of result, except where a countervailing federal policy militates
against application of state law. No damage is done to a state's sub-
stantive policy, because the balancing of state and federal interests is
not to occur unless the state rule is a procedure that is not intended to
federal district court in Kentucky had tolled the Virginia statute of limitations with respect to a
subsequent action brought in federal court in Virginia. Id at 538. The court found that the rule
against tolling had come into existence in Virginia because of the multiplicity of courts in its
judicial system, and the rule therefore reflected institutional considerations of the court system
unrelated to basic rights and obligations between the parties. Id at 537. The overriding federal
policy was the "unitary nature of the federal court system and the procedures it embodies for the
expeditious adjudication of cases on their merits." Id See also Poe v. Marquette Cement Mfg.
Co., 376 F. Supp. 1054, 1058-59 (D. Md. 1974) (dictum) (federal court may entertain action con-
cerning internal affairs of out-of-state corporation despite local courts' refusal to do so).
116. Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 314 (6th Cir. 1974). The Sixth Circuit refused to follow a
Kentucky rule of law which apparently would disallow suit in a local court by Kentucky residents
against the trustees of a pension fund the situs of which was not in Kentucky. Id at 310-I1. The
court found that the Kentucky policy derived from outdated notions of choice-of-law rules and in
personam jurisdiction, and was not meant to inhibit enforcement of state-created rights. Id at
314-15. Balanced against the "minimal" state policy were the overriding federal policies of the
grant of diversity jurisdiction itself: The providing of a separate system of independent, conve-
nient forums for the enforcement of rights free from local bias; uniform application of federal
venue provisions; and the need for uniform administration of nationwide trusts. Id at 316-18.
117. Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 550 F.2d 1320, 1325 (2d Cir.
1977). The Second Circuit applied the test in refusing to follow a New York door-closing statute
similar to that involved in Woods, see note 86 supra, which prohibited foreign corporations doing
business within the state without a license from bringing suit in state courts. 550 F.2d at 1324.
The unlicensed corporate plaintiff brought suit in a New York federal district court on the basis of
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction seeking enforcement of a contract for arbitration pursuant to
the United States Arbitration Act. Id at 1322-23. In allowing the action to proceed notwithstand-
ing the state rule, the court rested its decision on two grounds. First, it held that "New York may
not place such a financial and procedural burden on a foreign corporation seeking to vindicate its
right to bring a diversity action before the federal courts." Id at 1324. This rationale, standing
alone, seems dubious in view of the Supreme Court's decisions in Woods and Cohen. See notes
86-87 supra. The court, however, went on to apply the Szantay test and concluded that branches
one and two thereof would permit noncompliance with state law because New York's rule had no
relationship to a state substantive right. Rather, the right was afederal one-the enforceability of
arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce under afederal statute. As for part three of
the test, the state policy was outweighed by federal statutory interests in regulating arbitration
agreements involving interstate commerce. Id at 1325-26. Woods and Angel were distinguished
on the ground they involved enforcement of rights created solely by state law, whereas the present
suit involved federal rights. Id at 1326. Although the court's use of the Szantay test seems accu-
rate enough, the case probably could have been decided on a straightforward federal preemption
rationale. The opinion quotes the following language from the Supreme Court's opinion in Sola
Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (local rules of estoppel held inapplicable
with respect to defense based on federal antitrust laws):
[T]he doctrine of [Erie] is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which
the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations
which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in those
statutes, rather than by local law.
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advance substantive policies. A difference in outcome would be tolera-
ble under Hanna, because the difference relates only to a matter of pro-
cedure that is not likely to encourage forum shopping and result in
inequitable treatment of diverse and nondiverse litigants.
None of the other circuits, however, has adopted the Szantay
court's three-part analysis, each applying its own test for resolving con-
flicts between state and federal law from among those articulated by
the Supreme Court." 8 On the other hand, no court seems to explicitly
have ruled out the balancing of state and federal considerations as sug-
gested by Byrd. In recognition of the possible continued vitality of
Byrd, a recent law review article, by Professor Martin H. Redish and
Mr. Carter G. Phillips,"19 proposes that, rather than adopting Hanna's
"modified" outcome-determination test, courts should adopt instead a
"refined balancing test" in which the federal interests to be considered
in the analysis are carefully limited.'2° Four possible federal interests
118. See Wilson v. Nooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 503-04 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 865
(1973) (Byrd relied upon to reject a state's 12-person jury rule in favor of the federal court's 6-
person jury); Johnson Chem. Co. v. Condado Center, Inc., 453 F.2d 1044, 1045-47 (1st Cir. 1972)
(both Hanna's twin-aims test and Byrd's balancing approach relied upon to avoid application of a
Puerto Rican rule which would have resulted in dismissal of a class action for failure timely to
meet a security bonding requirement); Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160,
163, 166, 168 (3d Cir. 1976) (Pennsylvania door-closing statute viewed as "substantially" affecting
outcome and "worthy of federal respect," citing Angel and Wood, court perceived no federal
affirmative countervailing considerations, citing Byrd); Sun Sales Corp. v. Block Land, Inc., 456
F.2d 857, 862-63 (3d Cir. 1972) (the "reasoning" of Hanna protects "clear federal interests":
Pennsylvania rule requiring out-of-state real estate brokers to obtain license prior to commencing
action was rejected as applied to New York corporation not doing business in Pennsylvania);
Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1979) (principal reliance placed
upon Hanna to require compliance with Florida's medical malpractice screening panel); Baron
Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir. 1966) (Byrd relied upon in deciding
that the scope of counsel's arguments to the jury on the issue of damages "is a matter of federal
trial procedure"); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603 F.2d 646, 647-49 (7th Cir. 1979) (Byrd utilized
to uphold the applicability in federal court of Indiana's medical malpractice screening panel);
Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 382 F.2d 73, 78-79 (7th Cir. 1967)
(Hanna's twin-aims test preserves federal judge's power over remittitur of jury verdicts); Poitra v.
Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 25-27 (8th Cir. 1974) (quasi-balancing test akin to Szantay resulted in
rejection of North Dakota statute forbidding actions in state courts between Indians based on
claims arising on Indian reservation); Hot Oil Serv., Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir. 1966)
(Woods cited as precedent requiring application of Arizona statute forbidding actions against In-
dians in state courts); Palmer v. Ford Motor Co., 498 F.2d 952, 954-56 (10th Cir. 1974) (Byrd,
York, and Hanna applied seriatim to conclude that a state law requiring 12-person juries in civil
actions is not applicable in federal court); Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 554 F.2d
1165, 1171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Byrd and Hanna require application of state law with respect to
the circumstances which will suspend the tolling of the statute of limitations).
119. Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act." In Search of the Appropriate Di-
lemma, 91 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1977).
120. Id at 384-400. Professor Redish and Mr. Phillips contend that the Hanna Court overem-
phasized the forum shopping and inequality concerns of Erie and failed to focus on another im-
portant policy underlying Erie: the concern of federalism for accommodating competing state and
federal interests. Id at 373-80. The authors argue that forum shopping is not per se evil and that
disparity in treatment between diverse and nondiverse litigants is not always unfair, however,
assuming these are proper concerns, they should not be exclusive. Id at 377. A test which bal-
ances federal and state interests ultimately is necessary for proper resolution of Rules of Decision
Act cases. Id at 380. They believe any such test, however, must be carefully tailored to avoid
freewheeling, ad hoc determinations by federal courts, which may be tempted to apply vague and
undefined "federal interests" in derogation of state law. Id at 384, 389. They recognize that a
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are identified: The federal system as an independent system for ad-
ministering justice; the "quasi-seventh amendment" interest of as-
signing factual questions to the jury; the federal judge-jury
relationship; and the avoidance of expense or inconvenience resulting
from compliance with a state procedural rule. 2' It is only the latter
interest which the authors would allow in some circumstances to "out-
balance a truly significant competing state interest."' 22 The other three
interests are either rejected as too vague or are substantially limited in
their applicability.'23 If the financial cost to the federal judicial system
of applying a state rule resulted in its rejection, the proposed balancing
test would go a step beyond Byrd, since the Court there intimated that
any procedural rule bound up with substantive rights and obligations
should be applied without further inquiry into considerations of federal
case-by-case balancing approach might threaten the law's goal of predictability in the planning of
one's social and commercial affairs-the so-called private primary activity to which Justice Harlan
referred in his concurring opinion in Hanna. Id at 381-83. See note 105 supra. This threat is
reduced by Erie's requirement that state law be applied to issues wholly substantive in nature. As
to matters of a procedural nature, there is less danger of affecting primary behavior by choosing
federal over state law. Redish & Phillips, supra note 119, at 383. Such danger still exists, as for
example, in the case of a rule requiring the posting of a security bond prior to commencement of a
shareholder derivative action in order to deter the filing of frivolous suits. See Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548-49 (1949). Accordingly, the balancing test "must carefully
identify and assign weight to the federal and state interests to be considered on each side of the
balance" in order to minimize "the incidental, yet significant, harms of unpredictability in decid-
ing diversity choice-of-law issues." Redish & Phillips, supra note 119, at 384.
121. The first three interests were suggested in Byrd. 356 U.S. at 537-38. The authors feel that
the federal judge-jury relationship is analytically distinguishable from the seventh amendment
consideration. Redish & Phillips, supra note 119, at 387. Identification of the federal court's inter-
est in avoiding the expenses of compliance with state law was articulated in Wilson v. Nooter
Corp., 475 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865 (1973), in which the court refused to
follow a state's 12-person jury rule, noting the "not insignificant issue of expense and inconve-
nience given today's crowded docket." Id at 504.
122. Redish & Phillips, supra note 119, at 392. This federal interest, unlike most of the others,
see note 123 infra, is objective, concrete, and capable of quantification. Redish & Phillips, supra
note 119, at 391-94.
123. There is no "quasi-seventh amendment" interest: The amendment should be applied
outright to a situation such as that in Byrd, see text & notes 90-91 supra, or not at all. Redish &
Phillips, supra note 119, at 386-87. In other words, there is no residual "influence" of the seventh
amendment. Id at 387. Accord, Whicher, supra note 97, at 561-62. As for the federal interest in
the judge-jury relationship, "absent the support of the seventh amendment, it is not clear what
specific federal interests exist in this area." Redish & Phillips, supra note 119, at 387. The interest
of the federal courts as an "independent system for administering justice," which has been applied
by some federal courts, see notes 115-16, 118 supra, is criticized as vague and susceptible to "un-
principled ad hoc judicial decision making," which could lead to "uncertainty in the planning of
primary conduct." Redish & Phillips, supra note 119, at 389. Nevertheless, it is recognized that
there may be some interest in allowing a federal court to control procedural matters "bound up
with its daily internal operations" and this interest may be allowed to prevail "where the compet-
ing state interest is of relatively slight significance." Id at 391.
Possible state interests in procedural rules are of four types: Rules designed to affect behavior
or attain a substantive goal, such as evidentiary privileges or rules barring unlicensed corporations
doing local business from suing in state courts; rules for the conduct of trials which favor one
party more than another, such as burdens of proof; rules designed to ascertain the truth, such as
discovery rules; and rules merely of a housekeeping nature, such as the size and type of papers
submitted in court. The first two are deserving of the highest respect by federal courts, and the
third and fourth can be rejected more easily in favor of overriding federal interests. Id at 394-95.
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policy. 124
Lower federal courts have been compelled to continue searching
for an appropriate test to implement the Rules of Decision Act, because
neither Byrd nor Hanna necessarily provides definitive authority. The
appropriateness of a "countervailing" balance of federal policy in Byrd
seems clear in view of the strength of the seventh amendment right to
jury trial. 125 In Hanna, application of the refined outcome-determina-
tion test was technically dictum, since the Court held that direct con-
flicts between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state rules of
procedure are to be tested under the Enabling Act, not under the Rules
of Decision Act or the progeny of Erie. 126 Assuming the authoritative-
ness of the Hanna Court's redefinition of outcome determination, 27 it
is arguable nevertheless that the Court did not entirely abandon Byrd,
since Byrd was cited for the proposition that the outcome test "was
never intended to serve as a talisman."' 128 Although the Hanna Court
added its own checks on the outcome test, it did not explicitly deny the
existence of a residual check in the form of countervailing considera-
tions of federal policy.129
Of the various tests proposed by courts and commentators, the ap-
proach developed by the Fourth Circuit in Szanlay properly
124. 356 U.S. at 535-36. See Hill, supra note 86, at 604-06; Vestal, supra note 106, at 269.
125. It has been suggested that the Court should have straightforwardly applied the amend-
ment, which would have superseded a contrary state law. Friendly, supra note 67, at 403 n.95.
Whicher, supra note 97, at 560-61. Whicher takes the position that the Byrd test concerning coun-
tervailing federal policies should be strictly confined to jury trial issues. See also Smith, Blue
Ridge and Beyond" A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REv, 443,
450-51 (1962).
126. 380 U.S. at 469-71. See text & note 100 supra.
127. See text & notes 103-06 supra. The Court's directive obviously cannot be discounted
simply because it is dictum. For example, in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949),
the Court held that a prior decision was authoritative on an Erie issue although the case could
have been adequately decided on resjudicata grounds: "[W]here a decision rests on two or more
grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum." Id at 537. See McCoid. suprn
note 57, at 885 (Hanna was based "upon two separate grounds").
128. 380 U.S. at 466-67.
129. The Court sustained FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l) in Hanna under an Erie analysis on the
grounds that plaintiff would not have sought a federal forum simply to attain the benefits of the
Rule, nor would application of the Rule "raise the sort of equal protection problems to which the
Erie opinion alluded." 380 U.S. at 469-70. If avoidance of the state rule either had been perceived
by the Court as an inducement to forum shopping or would have produced an arguably unfair
result, the Court nevertheless might have justified application of the Federal Rule on the grounds
of a countervailing federal policy of uniformity in federal courts as to procedural matters, such as
the methods of serving process. Indeed, the Court quoted with approval the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion in Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963), which had
applied FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) in disregard ofstate law: "The purpose of the Erie doctrine, even as
extended in York and Ragan, was never to bottle up federal courts with 'outcome-determinative'
and 'integral-relations' stoppers-when there are 'affirmative countervailing [federal] considera-
tions' and when there is a Congressional mandate (the Rules) supported by constitutional author-
ity." Id at 764, quoted in Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473. In any event, the Hanna Court found all the
justification it needed for displacing state law in the Rules Enabling Act, under which it concluded
that methods of serving process are clearly procedural, since they relate only to the "form and
mode" of enforcing rights created under state law. 380 U.S. at 469, 473.
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synthesizes Erie and its progeny and seems best suited for dealing with
most Rules of Decision Act problems. The first branch of the test,
which requires application of state law defining the substantive rights
or obligations at issue, encompasses questions solely of substance, such
as the one presented in Erie. The second branch, which requires appli-
cation of state procedural rules intimately bound up with substantive
rights or obligations, encompasses such cases as York, Ragan, Woods,
and Cohen. The third branch covers Byrd and situations like the one in
Szantay, permitting application of federal procedure if the rejected
state procedure is unrelated to substantive policy and the federal inter-
ests in such application outweigh those of the state.
In essence, the Szantay test is a substance-procedure analysis.3
Federal courts are directed to apply state laws that are substantive or
quasi-substantive in the sense of being bound up with, or intended to
advance, substantive purposes. Procedural laws lacking such substan-
tive import need not be applied, depending on the existence of counter-
vailing federal policies. The Szantay test is preferable to the "twin-
aims" analysis of Hanna because it more clearly expresses the core
principle of federalism underlying Erie: Federal courts may not inter-
fere with clearly discernible state policies intended to affect substantive
rights. At the same time, it allows federal courts to impose their own
procedure on diversity claims if there is no conflict with state substan-
tive policies and there exist affirmative countervailing federal poli-
cies-whether grounded in the Constitution, a federal statute, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or perhaps fiscal concerns of the fed-
eral court system. The remainder of this Article will consider the ex-
tent to which Erie's principle of federalism, as properly articulated in
Szantay, requires the utilization of state medical malpractice screening
panels in federal diversity actions.
III. APPLICABILITY OF PRETRIAL SCREENING IN FEDERAL COURTS
The question whether the Rules of Decision Act requires litigants
130. Professor McCoid contends that a substance-procedure analysis is the appropriate test-
that uniformity of result with respect to substantive principles is what Erie was all about. McCoid,
supra note 57, at 887-88. See notes 76 & 106 supra. The Szantay test is also consistent with
Justice Harlan's position that Erie requires application only of those state laws that are intended
to affect "primary decisions respecting human conduct." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 475
(Harlan, J., concurring). See note 105 supra. Substantive rules and procedural rules intimately
related to substantive goals are the sort of laws falling within this category.
Professor Ely maintains, to the contrary, that a substance-procedure analysis has relevance
only under the Rules Enabling Act for purposes of testing whether a particular Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure contravenes a state's substantive policy. Ely, supra note 57, at 722-23. See note
100 supra. If the matter is not covered by a particular Federal Rule, the Rules of Decision Act is
invoked. The appropriate test under that Act, according to Professor Ely, is outcome determina-
tion as refined by Hanna, without inquiry into the policies underlying state law. Ely, supra note
57, at 717.
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in federal diversity actions to submit medical malpractice claims to a
state's screening panel in advance of trial can differ depending on
whether the panel is of the preaction or postcommencement variety.
Accordingly, they will be treated separately. The Erie question raised
by the admissibility of the panel findings into evidence at a subsequent
trial is common to both types of panel and is covered in section IV.
Preaction Screening Panels
Failure to comply with a mandatory preaction screening statute
would prevent enforceability of a plaintiffs malpractice claim in state
court on the grounds that the plaintiff either has failed to state a claim,
has failed to meet a condition precedent, or has brought an action in a
court lacking original subject matter jurisdiction. Applying the three-
part test for resolution of Rules of Decision Act problems suggested in
Szantay, the same result should follow in a federal court located in a
state with such a statute.
Screening panels do not fall under the first branch of the Szantay
test' 3' because they do not govern the substantive elements of a claim
or defense in medical malpractice. The rights and obligations flowing
from the relationship of patient and doctor or hospital are dependent
solely upon the state's substantive law; liability for medical malpractice
can be established with or without the screening panel. The second
branch of the test, however, is applicable, because the panels are proce-
dural rules "intimately bound up" with the rights and obligations being
asserted. As noted previously, 32 panels serve the procedural purposes
of facilitating settlements and reducing court dockets. The substantive
purposes include discouraging the assertion of groundless claims and
encouraging defendants to settle meritorious claims. In addition, the
use of preaction panels is intended generally to reduce medical mal-
practice litigation and the accompanying publicity, in order to keep in-
surance premiums down, assuring that health care professionals will
continue providing services at reasonable prices. In view of such sub-
stantive purposes, federal courts should insist upon compliance with
state law.' 3
3
131. See text & note I10 supra.
132. See text & notes 58-59 supra.
133. To the extent the state leaves the matter of screening to the voluntary choice of the par-
ties, see note 23 supra, the federal court should compel the procedure only if the option is exer-
cised by the parties. Similarly, if state law permits the parties to waive a panel that is otherwise
mandatory, the federal court should give effect to such a waiver. For example, in Cline v. Rich-
ards, 455 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), the federal court enforced a stipulation between the
parties waiving a hearing before Tennessee's postcommencement screening panel. Id at 46. The
court's decision is in accord with the general rule that "stipulations made by parties for the gov-
ernment of their conduct, or the control of their rights, in the trial of a cause, or the conduct of a
litigation, are enforced by the courts." In re New York, Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 98 N.Y. 447,
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The third branch of the test should not be applied to preaction
screening panels in view of the pervasive, clearly-defined substantive
policies furthered by their use. Moreover, there are no federal policies
or procedures in conflict with the screening procedures. It might be
argued that the federal policy underlying diversity jurisdiction-pro-
viding a neutral forum free of local bias' 34 -is infringed by subjecting
the out-of-state party's claim or defense in the first instance to a deci-
sionmaking panel composed solely of local professionals. 35 This pol-
icy is not defeated, however, since the nonbinding nature of the panel
hearing means the parties ultimately may have their case heard in fed-
eral district court. The only incursion on diversity jurisdiction is a de-
lay in its invocation, and federal courts have no overriding interest in
providing immediate access to the judicial process. Furthermore,
plaintiff will not be prejudiced by expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations, since initiation of the panel procedure tolls the statute,
36
and it is well-settled that federal courts in diversity actions are bound
by state statutes of limitation.'37 Allowing virtually nonexistent federal
policies to supersede the strong state policies evinced in screening
panels would do violence to the concept of federalism.
Preaction screening panels are analogous to the state statutes
deemed applicable in federal diversity actions in Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co. "I and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 13 The
door-closing statute in Woods, which prevented unqualified foreign
corporations from suing in state court, had both a procedural and sub-
stantive purpose. It served the procedural purpose of reducing court
dockets but had the substantive purpose of encouraging foreign corpo-
rations to register to do business within the state.14 0  In Cohen, the
453 (1885). This generalization is subject to the qualification that a stipulation may not contra-
vene public policy. Id
The court in Cline determined that the Tennessee statute was intended only to "facilitate the
disposition" of particular medical malpractice actions, and therefore "may be said rationally to be
for [the parties'] mutual benefits." 455 F. Supp. at 46. The court may have given the statutory
purpose too limited a scope, overlooking the public interests served by screening. See text & note
59 supra. In any event, the question should be resolved by reference to the state's law governing
waivers of statutorily required procedures.
134. See note 5 supra.
135. See Note, A Constitutional Perspective on the Indiana Medical Maipractice Act, 51 IND.
L.J. 143, 163 n. 105 (1975) ("requiring a hearing [before an Indiana panel] would subject an out-of-
state plaintiff to scrutiny by a-panel composed entirely of the defendant's Indiana colleagues").
The argument that screening panels constitute an incursion on federal diversity jurisdiction was
set forth in Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 221-23 (D.R.I. 1978), in connection with a
postcommencement reference panel. As more fully developed in the discussion of Wheeler, see
text & notes 187-203 infra, such incursion is a necessary concomitant of Erie.
136. See note 22 supra.
137. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-10 (1945).
138. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
139. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
140. Ely, supra note 57, at 728; McCoid, supra note 57, at 894; Redish & Phillips, supra note
119, at 398-99 (registration to do local business affects "primary commercial activity" of corpora-
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state's requirement that a bond be posted as security for defense costs
in stockholder derivative suits served not only the procedural purpose
of allocating the costs of litigation but also the substantive purpose of
inhibiting "strike suits."'' In both Woods and Cohen the state proce-
dural rules were intimately bound up with substantive goals and there-
fore properly applicable in federal court. Screening panels likewise
seek to influence substantive conduct. As in Woods, nonlitigative con-
duct is affected to the extent insurance companies might be prompted
to lower their premium rates and health care providers to maintain
proper services at reasonable costs. As in the case of Cohen, litigative
conduct is affected to the extent plaintiffs with weak claims are discour-
aged from pursuing court actions.
The reported decisions of federal courts are in agreement that Erie
mandates the applicability of preaction screening panels, but there is
little consistency in th6 use of Erie tests. In Edelson v. Soricelli, 42 the
Third Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, rejected plaintiffs' argument
that the Pennsylvania preaction arbitration process was "merely proce-
dural" and therefore inapplicable in federal court.'4 3 Drawing upon
the outcome-determinative test of York, the majority viewed the arbi-
tration requirement as "a condition precedent to entry into the state
judicial system.""'' Malpractice plaintiffs in federal courts "may not
have rights superior to state citizen plaintiffs because a fundamental
notion underlying Erie is that a federal court sitting in diversity merely
provides an impartial forum, not a different set of legal rules."' t4 5
Plaintiffs argued, alternatively, that even if the state arbitration
system were deemed outcome-determinative, it should nevertheless be
tions and may determine whether local citizens will be able to acquire jurisdiction to litigate
harms inflicted by such corporations). See McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. CIM Assocs., Inc., 438 F.
Supp. 245, 248 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (Florida corporation door-closing provision served primarily the
"nonitigative purpose of encouraging corporate qualification for the benefit of the state's citi-
zenry").
141. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,477-78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Ely, supra note 57,
at 729; McCoid, supra note 57, at 894. A groundless derivative action, brought solely for the
purpose of harassing corporate management in the hopes of obtaining a remunerative settlement,
would harm the corporation, its officers and directors and the other stockholders, Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1949). The imposition of liability for costs and
attorney's fees in the event the action fails, coupled with the condition precedent of a bond for
security of such expenses, would tend to discourage the bringing of meritless claims.
142. 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979).
143. Id at 133-35.
144. Id at 134. The court also analogized the Pennsylvania system to a statute of limitations,
since preaction arbitration "regulates the time and, in addition, the means of entry to the court-
room." Id
145. Id The majority expressed its approval of the decision in Marquez v. Hahnemann Medi-
cal College, 435 F. Supp. 972, 973 (E.D. Pa. 1976), in which Pennsylvania's arbitration legislation
was characterized as a door-closing statute. 610 F.2d at 134. The Marquez court stressed that
compliance with the legislation was necessary in order to preserve uniformity of result and to
avoid interfering with the statutory goal of ameliorating the medical malpractice crisis. 435 F.
Supp. at 973-74.
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rejected under Byrd because of a conflict with affirmative counter-
vailing federal considerations.'46 Data provided by plaintiffs showed
that from April 5, 1976 to August 31, 1979, a total of 2,466 malpractice
claims had been filed for arbitration in Pennsylvania, but only nine had
reached the hearing stage and only two had been appealed for judicial
trials de novo. t4 7 Based on these statistics, plaintiffs argued that arbi-
tration causes "oppressive delay," imposing "a substantial pressure on
them to settle or even forego their claims, thereby totally depriving
them of their opportunity for trial before a federal judge and jury."'4 8
Such consequences are "offensive to the federal interest in prompt de-
termination and adjudication of claims."' 14 9
The court agreed that Pennsylvania's screening mechanism was "a
resounding flop,"1 5 but held that plaintiffs' position would overextend
Byrd.'5 ' First, the Pennsylvania malpractice legislation, unlike the
judge-jury rule at issue in Byrd, was based on clear state interests, al-
beit unfulfilled, in making liability insurance available at reasonable
costs and providing for prompt resolution of claims.'5 2 Second, al-
though arbitration might delay a plaintifi's access to a jury trial,
thereby implicating Byrd's emphasis on federal jury procedures, such
delay is consonant with federal policy favoring arbitration as a means
of resolving disputes. 5 Third, the court felt that an outcome-determi-
nation analysis was still appropriate if the application of federal law
"would radically alter the substantive results of the state court sys-
tem."'54 In conclusion, the court stressed that the procedures do not
discriminate against noncitizens, because they apply with equal force to
all malpractice plaintiffs.'
146. 610 F.2d at 135.
147. Id
148. Id at 138.
149. Id
150. Id at 136.
151. Id at 138.
152. Id at 138-39.
153. Id at 139. The court cited § 3 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976),
and § 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976), as exam-
ples of federal statutes encouraging enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate.
Plaintiffs also contended that the admission at trial of the panel's findings was a usurpation of
the jury's function, because thejury would undoubtedly adopt the findings. 610 F.2d at 139. The
court again found no conflict with federal policy, noting that FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(3) allows
master's findings into evidence and FED. R. EviD. 704 allows opinion testimony on ultimate is-
sues. 610 F.2d at 140.
154. 610 F.2d at 140.
155. Id at 141.
Three days after Edelson was decided, another panel of the Third Circuit reached the same
result in Stoner v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 609 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Relying
upon a Hanna analysis, the court held that failure to follow Pennsylvania's arbitration process
would "deny the benefits of [the] procedure to a Pennsylvania defendant who happens to have
been sued by a non-resident," id at 111, and would "frustrate the legislature's legitimate goals."
Id
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The main thrust of the dissent was that Erie and its progeny are
inapposite, because Pennsylvania's arbitration panel constitutes a de
facto judicial tribunal for malpractice claims in substitution for state
courts.156  Relying upon an opinion of the Rhode Island District
Court,'57 the dissenting judge concluded that the arbitration procedure,
if binding on federal courts, would be an impermissible limitation on
federal jurisdiction. 5  Although states may validly create conditions
precedent to suit, they "may not limit the forum for a right to recovery
to only state courts."'' 59
The Fifth Circuit in Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital6 ° held that
"[u]nder any of the relevant tests," the steps set forth in Florida's
screening panel must be followed prior to commencement of an action
in federal court.' 6' The court relied principally upon Hanna's twin-
aims analysis of Erie: If out-of-state plaintiffs are allowed to bypass the
panel procedures by bringing their malpractice claims in federal court,
"Florida's medical malpractice statutory scheme will be inequitably ad-
ministered," and noncitizens will have a "substantial advantage" over
local citizens. 62 This, in turn, will encourage "the worst form of forum
156. Id at 141-46 (Rosen, J., dissenting).
157. Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 221-23 (D.R.I. 1978), discussed in text & notes
187-226 infra.
158. Judge Rosenn argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Railway Co. v. Whitton's
Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1872), should take precedence over the door-closing analysis of
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). 610 F.2d at 145. In Whil/on, a Wisconsin
statute vesting exclusive jurisdiction in state courts for wrongful death actions was held not bind-
ing on federal courts. 80 U.S. (13 Wall) at 286. See Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d
711, 718 (4th Cir. 1961) (Virginia statute vesting exclusive jurisdiction in state courts for tort
claims against cities held not binding on federal court). Judge Rosenn's analysis is questionable.
See text & notes 199-203 infra.
159. 610 F.2d at 145. The dissent also took issue with the majority's Erie analysis, arguing
that the arbitration panel is a "procedural device for allocating cases" rather than an alteration of
the substantive rights of the parties. Id at 147. Judge Rosenn rejected the majority's analogy to
the statute of limitations, see note 144 supra, contending that arbitration, which regulates entry to
the courtroom rather than defining the right to a remedy, is "closer to the federal rule governing
manner of service held to prevail over the state rule in Hanna." 610 F.2d at 147. To the extent
out-of-state malpractice plaintiffs might be encouraged to shop for a federal forum, such forum
shopping must be tolerated to enable noncitizens to exercise their right to "a fair federal forum."
id
With respect to the majority's application of Byrd, the dissent felt that the arbitration scheme
accomplishes no legitimate state interest because of its ineffective operation. Id at 148. It was
also argued that the arbitration procedure runs contrary to the federal interests in allowing full
and fair litigation before a jury, maintaining an appearance of neutrality for plaintiffs, and main-
taining judicial convenience and economical administration of justice. 'Id at 148-49. Federal
statutes evincing a policy in favor of consensual arbitration were distinguished on the ground that
the Pennsylvania system is compulsory. Id at 148. Finally, the dissenting judge believed that
federal cognizance of malpractice actions would not produce results substantially different from
those of the arbitration panel, but rather, would merely provide a different forum. Id at 149.
Judge Rosenn's analysis, like that of Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 224-29 (D.R.I.
1978), upon which it is based, seems at odds with a proper application of Erie. See text & notes
210-26 infra.
160. 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979).
161. Id at 1168.
162. Id
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shopping." '63 The court also emphasized that the panel procedures
were an integral part of Florida's attempts to stem the malpractice cri-
sis, and failure to apply the panel in federal court "would do grave
damage to the legislative response."' 64 Accordingly, the court held that
dismissal was proper until such time as the plaintiff complied with the
panel procedures. 65
In Hines v. Elkhart General Hospital,'66 the Seventh Circuit re-
jected plaintiffs' argument, based on Byrd, that the Indiana screening
panel infringes upon "the federal interest in preserving the essential
character of the federal courts, particularly the role of the jury." 67 The
court properly distinguished Byrd by noting that pretrial screening is a
procedure "bound up" with the rights and obligations established by
Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act, and is "not a mere form or mode"
for enforcing those rights and obligations. 68  Stressing the continued
availability of a jury trial, the court summarily concluded that the
screening process does not "disrupt the traditional federal system of
allocating functions between judge and jury."'16 9 The court paid lip
service to Hanna, stating that its holding was "consonant" with Erie's
objectives of discouraging forum shopping and avoiding inequitable
administration of the laws.170
Similarly, a number of district courts have held that plaintiffs may
not cross the threshold of the federal courthouse without having first
complied with state screening panels. In Davison v. Sinai Hospital,
Inc., t the court used a Hanna analysis in requiring compliance with
Maryland's preaction "arbitration" panel. First, it was observed that
unfairness would result between federal and state court litigants be-
cause "the character of litigation would differ drastically" if the federal
163. Id
164. Id at 1168-69.
165. The court noted that a district court properly could exercise discretion and stay the action
pending compliance with the mediation procedures. Id at 1170 n.8.
166. 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir.), aq9'g 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
167. Id at 648. Both the court of appeals and the district court distinguished Wheeler v.
Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978), discussed in text & notes 187-226 infira, in which this
argument had prevailed with respect to a postcommencement screening panel.
168. 603 F.2d at 648.
169. Id The court of appeals refused to consider plaintiffs' additional argument that the pro-
cedures were violative of the seventh amendment right to jury trial. See note 294 infra.
170. 603 F.2d at 648-49. Despite its allusion to Hanna, the court of appeals seemed content to
rely upon Byrd as the appropriate test. The district court, on the other hand, did not clearly
articulate the standard deemed proper for resolution of the problem. The district court observed
that the balancing test of Byrd may not be the appropriate standard for resolution of Erie
problems in view of the Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Hanna. 465 F. Supp. at 425. The
district court, however, found the Indiana screening panel applicable "even under the balancing
test." Id at 433-34. It was concluded that "the state interest" which prompted enactment of the
panel legislation, the "substantive nature" of its provisions, and "the lack of any conflicting fed-
eral procedure or substantive law" mandated its application. Id at 434. The court's reasoning
suggests acceptance of a test akin to the three-part Szantay analysis.
171. 462 F. Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978).
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court failed to require pretrial screening. 172 Second, plaintiffs seeking
to avoid the screening panel might be tempted to "manufacture" diver-
sity of citizenship in order to shop for a federal forum.'73
The Davison court, like the district court in Hines, rejected argu-
ments that the state statute, by its terms, excluded federal court actions
from its coverage.' 74 In both Davison and Hines, the statutory lan-
guage provided that screening procedures must be followed prior to the
commencement of an action in "any court of this state."171 The district
court in Hines reasoned that in cases based upon diversity jurisdiction,
a federal court sitting in Indiana in effect is "only another court of the
State."' 76  The Davison court examined the history of the Maryland
legislation and concluded that although the legislature did not consider
the issue, there was no clear intent to preclude its application in federal
courts. 177 Similar statutory language is used in all of the preaction
screening statutes, and the federal courts' conclusion that such lan-
guage does not preclude applicability in diversity actions seems accu-
rate.
Wells v. McCarthy"' required compliance with Missouri's screen-
ing procedurbs, stating that any other holding would result in discrimi-
nation against citizens of the state, one of the evils which Erie sought to
avoid. 179 The court also relied upon the Supreme Court's language in
Ragan that the "measure" of a state-created cause of action is to be
172. Id at 780.
173. Id
174. Id at 779.
175. The Indiana statute at issue in Hines provides that "[nio action against a health care
provider may be commenced in any court of this state before the claimant's proposed complaint
has been presented to a medical review panel." IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2 (Burns Supp. 1979)
(emphasis added). Davison dealt with Maryland's statute, which requires "arbitration" of mal-
practice claims seeking damages in excess of $5000: "An action or suit of that type may not be
brought or pursued in any court of this State except in accordance with this subtitle." MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). Rejection of the arbitrators'
award entitles the party to bring an "action to nullify the award" consisting of a trial de novo in
court. Id § 3-2A-06(b).
176. 465 F. Supp. at 424 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945)).
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court's analysis. 603 F.2d at 647.
177. 462 F. Supp. at 779. The court's conclusion is consistent with Angel v. Bullington, 330
U.S. 183 (1947), where it was argued that a North Carolina rule disallowing suits on deficiency
judgments in state courts was not intended to apply to federal courts. The Supreme Court rejected
this reasoning:
If North Carolina has authoritatively announced that deficiency judgments cannot be
secured within its borders, it contradicts the presuppositions of diversity jurisdiction for a
federal court in that State to give such a deficiency judgment. North Carolina would
hardly allow defeat of a Statewide policy through occasional suit in a federal court.
What is more important, diversity jurisdiction must follow State law and policy. ...
Id at 191-92. A similar problem of interpretation arises in the case of postcommencement panel
legislation that calls for panels in specific state courts. See note 186 infra.
178. 432 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Mo. 1977). The Missouri statute subsequently was declared un-
constitutional. Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110
(Mo. 1979).
179. 432 F. Supp. at 689.
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found only in state law: "It accrues and comes to an end when local
law so declares."' 80 The earliest reported decision to pass upon the
applicability in federal court of screening panels was Flotemersch v.
Bedford County General Hospital,"8 ' in which a district court in Ten-
nessee held simply that plaintiff had failed in her complaint to allege
compliance with a statutory condition precedent. 82 The court made no
mention of Erie, but declared that plaintiff had failed to state a claim
for relief under the "substantive law of the state."' 83 Relying upon
many of the foregoing precedents, a district court in Louisiana in
Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,84 held, without amplification,
that Louisiana's panel was applicable in federal court.
The failure of the courts to approach the Erie problem with a more
consistent analysis is regrettable, but the results of the decisions to date
are accurate. The courts are maintaining the balance of federalism by
deferring to the clear substantive interests bound up in screening
panels.
Postcommencement Panels
The convening of a screening panel after commencement of an
action may present an administrative problem for federal courts that is
not present in the case of a preaction screening panel. The precom-
mencement panel affects the dispute before judicial jurisdiction is in-
yoked, whereas the postcommencement panel interrupts the normal
judicial process. Nevertheless, like its preaction counterpart, a
postcommencement reference panel furthers substantive purposes by
discouraging prosecution of baseless claims, encouraging settlements,
and seeking generally to stabilize the health care system. 8 5 To the ex-
tent reference panels are mandatory under state law, Erie would seem
180. 337 U.S. at 533. See note 85 supra. Applying Ragan to the case at bar, the court rea-
soned that a plaintiffs judicial cause of action in medical malpractice did not "accrue" under
Missouri law until after a screening panel had reached its decision. 432 F. Supp. at 689.
181. 69 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
182. Id at 557.
183. Id The Tennessee statute under consideration was of the preaction variety. The current
Tennessee statute, however, provides for reference to a panel after the action has been com-
menced. See note 24 supra.
184. 472 F. Supp. 468, 471 (E.D. La. 1979).
185. It has been suggested that the primary purpose of "court-sponsored," ie., postcommence-
ment, panels is to remove cases from the trial docket rather than to discourage the bringing of any
action at all, distinguishing them from preaction panels. Baird, Munsterman & Stevens, supra
note 13, reprinted in HEW REPORT, supra note 1, at 272 app. By providing a screening panel
which encourages the abandonment of meritless claims and the settlement of good claims, how-
ever, a "docket-controlling" reference procedure serves the wider purpose of inhibiting medical
malpractice litigation, which in turn will help relieve the medical malpractice crisis. Redish &
Phillips, supra note 119, at 399 n.228, 400 n.231. See Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164,
1174 (5th Cir. 1979) ("One significant factor causing the rising insurance rates was an increase in
malpractice litigation, and one way to reduce such litigation was to screen out non-meritorious
claims through the use of liability mediation panels.")
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to require their utilization by the federal courts in diversity actions. 18 6
A contrary conclusion, however, was reached by the Federal Dis-
trict Court for Rhode Island in Wheeler v. Shoemaker.8 7 In an action
against a Rhode Island doctor and hospital brought by citizens of
Washington, defendants moved for reference to a medical liability me-
diation panel as applicable in Rhode Island's superior court. 8 Such
panels are comprised of a "special master" appointed by the presiding
justice of the superior court and a Rhode Island attorney and physi-
cian.I 9 The parties are afforded discovery under the state rules of civil
procedure and hearings before the panel are governed by the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence.' 90 The panel's findings are deemed accepted
by both parties unless one party rejects them within thirty days.' 9 ' If
the case proceeds to trial, the panel's findings on the issue of liability
are admissible in evidence. 192 There is no provision for the calling of
panelists as witnesses, although any expert witness consulted by the
panel may be called.' 93
The district court concluded that the Rhode Island screening panel
186. In some cases the Erie problem can be minimized or avoided entirely if. as a matter of
state law, the convening of a panel is not required. This possibility exists in the case of reference
panels whose use lies in the discretion of the trial judge or the parties, see note 25 jupra;
mandatory panels that are voluntarily waived by the parties pursuant to stipulation. see note 133
supra; or panels whose use is intended solely for particular state courts. As an example of the
third contingency, the New York statute provides for panels to facilitate the disposition of medical
malpractice actions "in the supreme court," N.Y. JuD. LAW § 148-a(l) (McKinney Supp. 1979-
80), which is New York's trial court of general jurisdiction. There are also several trial courts of
limited monetary jurisdiction in New York, see D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 9-22 (1978),
and two cases have held that the panel legislation is inapplicable in such courts. La Placa v.
Boorstein, 87 Misc. 2d 45, 46, 385 N.Y.S.2d 250, 251 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (no panel hearing may be
obtained in an action in the New York City Civil Court, which has monetary jurisdiction only up
to $10,000); Ernst v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 86 Misc. 2d 694, 695, 382 N.Y.S.2d 915, 915 (Dist. Ct,
1976) (district court, with monetary jurisdiction only up to $6000, lacks power to convene panel).
Thus, it might be concluded that the New York legislation, by its terms, would be inapplicable in
a federal court, thereby eliminating the Erie problem. On the other hand, the La Placa court
observed that the legislative intent was to provide for screening panels in "cases wherein substan-
tial damages are sought," 87 Misc. 2d at 46, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 251, which arguably would include
federal court actions in which a claim for damages must exceed $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(1976).
The latter position would be in accord with the Massachusetts procedure laid down in Austin
v. Boston Univ. Hosp., - Mass. -, -, 363 N.E.2d 515, 518-19 (1977). The Massachusetts legisla-
tion requires that in all actions alleging medical malpractice a panel shall be convened by the
"superior court." MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1979). .tttslin held that
actions commenced in other state courts within Massachusetts should be transferred to the supe-
rior court for the purpose of a panel hearing, after which the action is to be transferred back to the
other state court. - Mass. at -, 363 N.E.2d at 519. The procedure was extended by analogy to
actions brought in federal court. Id Lacking guidance from the state courts, the federal district
court in Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978), similarly concluded that the Rhode
Island panel, used in conjunction with the "filing of a civil action in superior court," was intended
to apply to federal diversity actions. Id at 221 n.4.
187. 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978).
188. Id at 219.
189. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-1 (Supp. 1978).
190. Id § 10-19-5.
191. Id § 10-19-9(a).
192. Id § 10-19-8.
193. Id
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functioned as an "adjunct of the superior court" and, as such, would
impermissibly deprive the federal court of "the congressional grant of
diversity jurisdiction."'' 94 The court also rejected defendants' alterna-
tive request that the court convene its own panel, staffed under federal
direction, on the grounds that such panel would interfere with the ordi-
nary role of the jury in federal court, would create an appearance of
unfairness to plaintiffs, and would impose too great a financial burden
on the federal system.'95
The court argued that reference to a state-created panel furnishes
the state court with "an opportunity to pass upon the claim initially"
and therefore "is tantamount to vesting original jurisdiction in state
court."' 96 The court felt that subjecting the claim to a panel comprised
of local professionals whose decision would influence both settlement
negotiations and the course of the subsequent trial would expose the
noncitizen plaintiff to the local bias and prejudice that diversity juris-
diction was intended to avoid.' 97 The panel legislation therefore was
an impermissible effort "to limit enforcement of state-created causes of
action to state tribunals."' 98
The court's reasoning is not persuasive. The error of the analysis
is the court's failure to consider whether the substantive purposes un-
derlying the reference procedure constituted an Erie-mandated limita-
tion on the federal court's jurisdiction. State door-closing statutes, such
as the corporate registration requirement in Woods' 19 and statutory
conditions to litigation, such as the security bond requirement in Co-
hen,2°0 do not "divest" a court, state or federal, of jurisdiction. They
merely "burden" the right of enforcement of a claim for the purpose of
achieving some substantive goal. Screening panels perform the same
function. To the extent that a federal court is deprived of jurisdiction
by reference to a screening panel, the ouster is only temporary. Assum-
ing either party rejects the panel decision, the action will continue in
federal court in normal fashion; diversity jurisdiction will remain in-
tact.20 1 Insofar as a panel decision in favor of local defendants may te
194. 78 F.R.D. at 219, 221-23.
195. Id at 223-29.
196. Id at 221.
197. Id at 222. See note 5 supra.
198. 78 F.R.D. at 222.
199. See text & note 86 supra.
200. See text & note 87 supra.
201. The continued availability of diversity jurisdiction distinguishes reference panels from
state laws which seek to vest exclusive jurisdiction in state courts. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v.
Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 445, 458 (1874) (Wisconsin statute requiring foreign corporations to
waive their right to remove state actions to federal court held void); Chicago & N.W. R.R. Co. v.
Whitton, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 270, 286 (1872) (plaintiff permitted to bring wrongful death action in
federal district court despite Wisconsin statute purporting to limit jurisdiction of such actions to
state courts); Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 718 (4th Cir. 1961) (Virginia
statute waiving tort immunity for cities but only as to actions commenced in state courts held not
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biased because it is rendered by local citizens, any such bias may be
brought to the jury's attention, as in the case of an expert witness's
opinion.2 °2 In short, the Wheeler court failed to take into account the
qualification that Erie imposed on the federal court's exercise of diver-
sity jurisdiction; namely, uniform treatment of litigants with respect to
rules having substantive import.2 °3
The second holding in Wheeler was that Erie did not require the
federal court's appointment of its own reference panel.2" Although the
screening legislation need not be interpreted as contemplating federal
administration of the panel, the court was compelled to address the
issue from this perspective as a result of its conclusion that reference to
a state-operated panel would violate the principles of federal jurisdic-
tion. Based on the analysis of Erie set forth in the second portion of the
opinion,20 5 the court probably would have decided against applicability
of the state law regardless of whether it viewed the procedure as calling
for reference to a state or federally created panel.
The court properly rejected plaintiffs' argument that screening
panels are "purely procedural" and, under Hanna, superseded in fed-
eral courts by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, governing the use of
court-appointed masters.20 6 Plaintiff contended that mandatory refer-
ence of all medical malpractice claims squarely confficts with the Fed-
eral Rule, which allows discretionary references to masters in jury cases
only as an "exception and not the rule" and only "when the issues are
complicated. ' 20 7 The court noted the similarities between the two pro-
cedures but concluded they are "simply two different animals."20 8
binding on federal court). Statutes requiring the convening of screening panels do not discrimi-
nate against federal jurisdiction by denying relief in federal actions that otherwise would be avail-
able in state court.
202. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 607[031 (1978); 3 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 949 (1940). The ability to impeach the panel's findings helps preserve the
constitutionality of their admissibility. See note 289 infra. Admissible panel findings frequently
have been likened to expert testimony. See note 261 infra.
203. Like door-closing statutes, screening panels can be viewed as an "implied limitation" on
the federal court's jurisdiction. See Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 718 (4th
Cir. 1961) ("To the extent it may be said that such cases [e.g., Angel, Woods, see note 86 supra]
require a federal court to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction, it is a rational development of the
Erie doctrine"); Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1956).
204. 78 F.R.D. at 229.
205. Id at 224-29.
206. Id at 223.
207. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). See generally 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 11 53.05[1], 53.14[2] (2d ed. 1977); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, at
§§ 2601-2603.
208. 78 F.R.D. at 224. The similarities include the fact of court appointment, the ability to
conduct an evidentiary hearing, and the admissibility of the findings at a subsequent trial. One of
the differences according to the court, aside from the discretionary versus mandatory nature of the
procedures, is the scope of the master's findings, which generally are limited to facts, whereas
screening panels determine ultimate issues of liability. In this regard, the court felt that masters'
reports are intended to aid the jury in the fact-finding process while screening panels are intended
[Vol. 21
MEDICAL M4LPRACTICE SCREENING PANELS
Thus, the issue was to be resolved under the Rules of Decision Act and
Erie. The court determined that the appropriate Erie test is a straight
balancing approach which considers whether state interests may be
outweighed by countervailing considerations of federal policy-the
methodology suggested in the Redish-Phillips article.20 9 The danger in
using such test, as exemplified in Wheeler, lies in the possibility that
federal interests will be allowed to outweigh state procedural rules
bound up with substantive rights-a result the Supreme Court rejected
in Byrd.
The Wheeler court found that Rhode Island's screening procedure
interfered with the role of the jury in the federal system by replacing
the jury's decision, in effect, with that of the reference panel.210 Re-
viewing the history of the Rhode Island act, the court noted that the
legislature lacked "'faith' in the jury's ability to fairly decide liability
and damages"' in medical malpractice cases and therefore instituted
a panel whose conclusions on the issue of liability would be brought to
the jury's attention with a view toward influencing their decision.21 2
This function of the panel constituted interference with the jury's role
because "most juries are not likely to conduct an independent evalua-
tion of the evidence and conclude contrary to a court-appointed panel
of esteemed professionals who have reviewed all the evidence. 21 3
The Wheeler court recognized that failure to follow the reference
procedure would frustrate the state's substantive goals of eliminating
frivolous claims, encouraging settlements, stabilizing malpractice insur-
ance rates, and generally favoring medical malpractice defendants.2 14
It was also conceded that the twin aims of Erie, as articulated in
Hanna, would be frustrated, since refusal to appoint a panel would
encourage forum shopping by out-of-state plaintiffs and would produce
inequity towards defendants who might be exposed to a greater risk of
to displace the jury. Id at 223-24. On this point, the court's reasoning is questionable in view of
the general agreement that a screening panel decision is analogous to the testimony of an expert
witness which the jury is free to accept or reject. See text & notes 291-93 infra. The court was
correct, however, in holding that FED. R. Civ. P. 53 does not cover the specific subject matter of
medical malpractice claims, hence eliminating a direct conflict. 78 F.R.D. at 224. This conclusion
is in accord with Cohen, wherein the Supreme Court held that a New Jersey bond requirement in
stockholder's derivative suits did not conflict with FED. R. Civ. P. 23, which covers derivative suits
but says nothing about bonds. 337 U.S. at 556.
If screening panels are viewed as directly conflicting with FED. R. Civ. P. 53, the appropriate
test lies under the Rules Enabling Act, rather than the Rules of Decision Act. Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 469-71 (1965). Assuming such conflict, the Wheeler plaintiffs' contention that the
state rule automatically should yield to the Federal Rule is erroneous in view of the Enabling
Act's proscription against Federal Rules abridging substantive rights. See note 100 supra.
209. 78 F.R.D. at 225 n.9. See text & notes 119-24 supra.
210. 78 F.R.D. at 225-27.
211. Id at 226.
212. Id at 225-26.
213. Id at 226.
214. Id at 227.
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adverse settlements and jury verdicts if they are sued in federal court,
rather than in state courts where the panel procedures are in effect.2I5
These considerations were outweighed, however, by the federal court's
interest in preserving the role of the jury.2 16 The court also identified a
countervailing federal interest in "the fairness of the process," arguing
that "adherence to the panel procedure will result, at the very least, in
the appearance of unfairness to plaintiffs" and "undermine the confi-
dence and respect for judgments obtained in federal court." 217
The court's reasoning with respect to federal interests in jury deci-
sions and fairness would encompass references to state-operated
panels, as well as to panels convened by a federal court. Since the
court viewed the issue as whether it should convene its own panel
financed out of federal funds, however, the court also held that the
state's interests were outweighed by the federal interest in "controlling
the administrative burdens imposed on its judiciary and the expansion
of its staff and budget," 21 8 an interest identified in the Redish-Phillips
article.2 19 In conclusion, the state's interests in curtailing medical mal-
practice claims were outweighed by "the federal interests in controlling
both the character, quality and cost of the adjudicatory process in fed-
eral court. 22°
In permitting considerations of federal policy to outweigh the sub-
stantive purposes underlying Rhode Island's screening procedures, the
Wheeler court upset the balance of federalism that Erie seeks to pro-
tect. The court's objection to the "unfairness" of the screening process
seems to be a veiled attack on its constitutionality under the due proc-
ess clause.22' Although a federal court may have a general interest in
the fairness of its procedures, this interest should not be allowed to su-
persede a presumptively valid state procedure that furthers significant
215. Id at 227-28.
216. Id at 226. The court expressly disavowed that it was deciding the case on seventh
amendment grounds, and relied instead on the suggestion in Byrd that "[t]he federal interest in the
jury's role is not necessarily coterminous with the seventh amendment guarantee." Id at 226 n. 12.
It seems clear that the seventh amendment is not violated by pretrial screening procedures. See
text & notes 272-97 infra.
217. 78 F.R.D. at 228.
218. Id "[Tihe state legislature cannot unilaterally thrust the substantial, added inconve-
nience and cost onto the federal system." Id
219. Redish & Phillips, supra note 119, at 392-94. See text & notes 121-22 supra.
220. 78 F.R.D. at 229.
221. See Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1176 (5th Cir. 1979) (in response to due
process challenge to Florida's preaction screening panel, court examined "fairness" of the dealings
between the state and malpractice claimants). The test of due process is whether legislation is
arbitrary and irrational, bearing no reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). Courts have been directed to refrain from
stiking down legislation on due process grounds simply because they deem it unwise or improvi-
dent. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955). Medical malpractice legislation has survived all due process challenges under this stan-
dard. See note 10 supra.
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substantive goals.222 Similarly, the court's analysis of the panel's "in-
terference" with the role of the jury, although arguably an Erie issue
pursuant to Byrd,223 is more appropriate for an inquiry directly under
the seventh amendment.224 Moreover, Byrd suggested that absent the
direct applicability of the seventh amendment, a federal court's interest
in protection of the jury's function should yield to state rules intimately
related to specific substantive interests. 225 The court's final point-that
compliance with state procedure would impermissibly interfere with
financial interests of the federal court system-need not have been
reached if the court had properly interpreted the legislation as requir-
ing the convening of a panel by state authorities, thereby avoiding the
conflict. In any event, such federal fiscal interests should yield to the
significant substantive interests underlying medical malpractice screen-
ing panels, a conclusion reached by the very authors of the balancing
test adopted in Wheeler.226
A more accurate result was reached by the Federal District Court
for Massachusetts in Byrnes v. Kirby.227 The Byrnes court ordered ref-
erence of the plaintiff's malpractice claim to a Massachusetts screening
panel comprised of a justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court and a
Massachusetts-licensed physician and attorney.228 The Massachusetts
statute, like that of Rhode Island, provides for a hearing, the results of
which may be introduced at trial.229 If the panel finds for the defend-
ant, an additional burden is imposed upon the plaintiff: He must post a
$2000 bond as security for defendant's costs, including witness' and at-
torney's fees, in the event the plaintiff does not prevail at trial.2 3°
The court relied upon Cohen and Hanna in concluding that refer-
ence was mandatory. The court focused on the bonding requirement as
creating a substantive liability, analogous to the bond in stockholder
derivative actions in Cohen.231 In addition, allowing a noncitizen
plaintiff to bypass the reference panel would violate the twin aims of
Erie by encouraging forum shopping and promoting inequitable ad-
222. Redish & Phillips, supra note 119, at 391.
223. See text & notes 89-92 supra.
224. Id at 386-87; Whicher, supra note 97, at 561-62. See note 123 supra.
225. 356 U.S. at 535-38. See text & notes 93-94 supra.
226. Professor Redish and Mr. Phillips view the conflict between state medical malpractice
screening panels and the "cost-avoidance" interest of the federal system as a "tie" between signifi-
cant competing interests. Redish & Phillips, supra note 119, at 400. Unlike the Wheeler court, the
authors would allow the imposition of such costs on the federal courts in deference to the state's
interest in "controlling potential litigants' primary conduct." Another recent article, however,
agrees with the reasoning and conclusions of the Wheeler court. Turner, Medical Malpraclice
Arbitration on the Erie Railroad 11 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 1, 22-25 (1979). Id.
227. 453 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1978).
228. Id at 1016, 1020. See MASs. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1979).
229. Id
230. Id
231. 453 F. Supp. at 1019.
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ministration of the laws.232 The court also declared that there was "no
federal policy, such as that favoring jury determination of factual issues
recognized in Byrd that would be contravened by reference of this case
to a state medical malpractice tribunal. '233 In implementing the refer-
ence, the Byrnes court was aided by the prior opinion of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Austin v. Boston University Hospi-
tal.234 The Austin court had suggested that if a federal court deter-
mines that reference procedures are applicable in a diversity action, the
reference should be made to the state superior court, which will appoint
a tribunal to act on the matter, "after which its findings will be trans-
mitted to the clerk of the Federal Court."235 Thus, the Byrnes court,
unlike the Wheeler court, did not entertain the notion of appointing its
own panel.
Because Erie requires application of procedural laws closely re-
lated to substantive rights, the result reached in Byrnes is the correct
one. To be sure, the use of reference panels may present problems of
administration where no guidance has been provided by local law on
the mechanics of convening such a panel in a federal action. It has
been said, however, that in state-federal conflicts with "substantive
overtones," it is important for federal courts "to take advantage of
every available procedural device to indirectly accomplish a coordina-
tion of the two systems. 2 36 The approach suggested by Massachusetts'
highest court provides a workable model that should be followed else-
where: References from the federal court should be made to the state
court empowered to convene a panel under the state legislation, after
which the panel findings can be returned to the federal court for further
proceedings.237 Such procedure eliminates the economic concerns ex-
pressed in Wheeler, since the federal court will not be required to pay
the expenses of the panel.
232. Id
233. Id
234. - Mass.-, 363 N.E.2d 515 (1977).
235. Id at-, 363 N.E.2d at 519.
236. Callahan v. American Sugar Refining Co., 47 F.R.D. 359, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (Vein-
stein, J.) (loss of consortium action by wife brought in federal court while husband's primary
action for negligence was pending in state court, creating conflict with state policy favoring joint
trials of such actions).
237. The federal court should grant a continuance while the malpractice claim is pending
before the state panel. Cf. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1170 n.8 (5th Cir. 1979) (it
lies within discretion of district judge to stay action pending compliance with state screening
panel); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 29, § 2352 (decision to grant a continuance lies in the
sound discretion of the court). Since the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure have been held to supersede contrary state discovery rules, Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1, 14-16 (1941) (FED. R. Civ. P. 35 given precedence over state law disallowing physical
examinations), the parties should be entitled to continue the discovery process in accordance with
federal law. The physical transmittal of the reference to the state court and its return to the
federal court can be accomplished through procedures analogous to those used in implementing
references to federal masters. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(d)(1), (e)(1).
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Delaware is the only state that has made explicit provision in its
reference panel legislation for actions brought in federal court. The
statute provides that the State Insurance Commissioner shall convene a
panel "upon request" of a federal court in Delaware "in the manner
instructed by the said federal court," provided, however, that such
panel shall not be convened "unless provisions are made for the pay-
ment of the compensation and expenses" of panelists and expert wit-
nesses "out of the funds other than those of the General Fund of the
State."23 The Commissioner's ability to refuse acceptance of a federal
court's request for a reference seems unwise to the extent the federal
court is expected to absorb the costs of such panel. The statute pro-
vides, however, that the Commissioner's selection of panelists and their
powers and duties "shall be subject to the order of [the federal] court
and/or such rules as the federal court system shall designate for the
implementation of such panels." '239 Thus, the statute contains sufficient
flexibility to allow the federal court to fashion an order eliminating or
minimizing any imposition on the federal treasury, as for example, by
reducing the number of panelists and expert witnesses, by requesting
that the Commissioner select panelists willing to serve without compen-
sation, or by limiting the number of days for a hearing.240
Other states with reference panels should follow Delaware's lead
in making statutory provision for actions in federal courts, but a health-
ier regard for federalism counsels inclusion of an explicit provision that
the expenses of such panels be borne by the state. In the absence of
such a funding provision or some other arrangement relieving the fed-
eral treasury of responsibility for the operational costs of reference
panels, a federal court may be tempted to follow the doubtful lead of
238. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6814 (Supp. 1978). Delaware's panel consists of two health
care providers, one attorney, two lay persons and a nonvoting ex officio member of the Commis-
sioner's staff, who have the power to appoint expert witnesses to review the evidence and submit
testimony or reports. Id §§ 6804, 6810. Each panelist, other than the Commissioner's staff mem-
ber, is entitled to $100 per diem plus expenses, not to exceed a total of $700 per panelist. Id
§ 6813. An expert witness is entitled to reimbursement of expenses and a "reasonable fee" to be
fixed by the panel. Id § 6810. All fees and expenses are to be paid "out of the general funds of
the State," id § 6813, subject to the apparent exception in § 6814 for panels in federal court
actions. The panel is empowered in its discretion to impose such costs up to a maximum of$1000
upon the party who loses before the panel. Id § 6813. If the case goes to trial, the panel expenses
may be assessed as costs subject to the same limitation. Id.
239. Id § 6814.
240. The court might also take advantage of Delaware's provision allowing imposition of
panel costs on the parties. See note 238 supra. FED. R. EvID. 706 provides additional guidance in
its procedures for the appointment of expert witnesses. Such court-appointed witnesses are enti-
tled to reasonable compensation either payable from federal funds, or "paid by the parties in such
proportion and at such time as the court directs." Id 706(b). By analogy, such compensatory
scheme could be applied to the expert witnesses consulted by a screening panel, or to the panelists
themselves, whose collective opinion has been treated as that of an expert witness. See note 261
infra. Another analogy with respect to panelists can be made to FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a), which
allows compensation of masters to be fixed by the court and charged to the parties. The Wheeler
court, unfortunately, rejected such possibilities. 78 F.R.D. at 227 n.14, 228.
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Wheeler and refuse to implement the important state policies underly-
ing the screening of medical malpractice claims.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF PANEL FINDINGS IN SUBSEQUENT TRIALS
The admissibility of a screening panel's findings during a subse-
quent trial in federal court raises an Erie question separate from that of
compliance with the panel hearing itself. Resolution of the admissibil-
ity issue requires consideration not only of Erie but also of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the seventh amendment.
Erie and the Federal Rules of Evidence
In federal courts matters of evidence, which can be classified gen-
erally as "procedural" rules,24 are governed by the congressionally en-
acted Federal Rules of Evidence.242 Erie complicates the law of
evidence in diversity actions because some evidence rules are closely
related to substantive rights and policies under state law.243 If a state's
rule of evidence is bound up with such substantive interests, Erie would
seem to require compliance with the state rule notwithstanding the gen-
eral applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence.244 Deciding the
question of admissibility of medical malpractice panel decisions in ac-
241. See Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275, 277-82 (1962);
Ely, supra note 57, at 740.
242. The Supreme Court originally drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence, but some
questioned the scope of the Court's power to prescribe rules of evidence under the Rules Enabling
Act. See generally Degnan, supra note 241. Congress substantially modified certain provisions of
the Supreme Court's proposed Rules and enacted the current version, effective July 1, 1975. Act
of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). See generally 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 45 (1979); C. WRIGHT, supra note 64, § 93 at 456-58.
243. See Weinstein, The Unjformity-Conformiy Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of FederalfRules of
Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 353, 363-73 (1969). Examples of such rules include burdens of
proof, presumptions, privileges, and competency of witnesses. Id See text & notes 257-59 infra.
244. If there is a square conflict between a state rule of evidence and one of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, however, Erie becomes irrelevant. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) de-
clared that Congress has power under the Constitution to regulate all matters in federal courts
"rationally capable of classification as either" substantive or procedural. See note 71 supra. As-
suming, therefore, that Congress has plenary power over evidence in federal courts, see Degnan,
supra note 241, at 278, 288, a congressionally enacted Federal Rule of Evidence should supersede
a contrary state rule, even if the latter expresses a substantive policy. The Supreme Court, on the
other hand, is prohibited by the Rules Enabling Act from promulgating rules abridging "substan-
tive" rights. See note 100 supra. Thus, if enacted by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Enabling
Act, a Federal Rule of Evidence could not displace a state rule closely related to substantive
policy.
Professor Ely cites privileges as an example of evidentiary rules bound up with substance: If
rules of privilege were included in Federal Rules of Evidence enacted by the Supreme Court, they
would have to yield to conflicting state rules; if enacted by Congress, the Federal Rules would
prevail, since Congress is not bound by the restrictive language of the Rules Enabling Act. Ely,
supra note 57, at 738-40. The issue of privileges is moot because Congress chose to defer to state
law on this issue. See text & notes 251-59 infra.
If an evidentiary issue is not covered explicitly by the Federal Rules of Evidence, Erie and
the Rules of Decision Act become the appropriate standards. Degnan, supra note 241, at 288; Ely,
supra note 57, at 739.
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cordance with Erie, however, does not conflict with the Federal Rules
of Evidence.
If panel findings are admissible under state law, it is arguable that
the same result should obtain in federal court pursuant to the hearsay
exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C). The Rule permits the
admissibility of "[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth. . . factual find-
ings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law.""24 The Supreme Court has cited the Rule in sanction-
ing the admission of administrative agency findings and an arbitration
award during subsequent employment discrimination cases.24 6 Screen-
ing panel decisions would seem to fall within the same category of ad-
missible reports sanctioned by Rule 803(8)(C). 247 The admissibility of
panel findings is also analogous to the admissibility of a federal
master's report permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(e).24 8
An apparent conflict with these rules would arise, however, in a state
which excludes panel findings from a subsequent trial. The federal
court should conform to state practice in either case because Erie, as
well as other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, so requires.
In deciding whether to allow panel findings into evidence, strong
policy considerations have influenced state legislatures. States disal-
lowing admissibility might be fearful that the panel decision will un-
duly influence the jury.24 9 States providing for admissibility, on the
-other hand, have determined that this might be the best way to en-
courage cooperative conduct by the litigants in their participation in
panel proceedings and subsequent settlement negotiations.25 ° In either
case, substantive state policies would be undermined if a federal court
failed to follow the state rule.
Fortunately, the Federal Rules of Evidence were designed to oper-
ate, for the most part, in conformity with Erie's principle of deference
to state substantive policy. The three rules governing presumptions,
25 1
245. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
246. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n.39 (1976) (prior finding of no discrimination
in administrative hearing admissible in subsequent trial de novo); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974) (arbitration award pursuant to collective bargaining agreement admis-
sible in subsequent trial).
247. Two courts have described the admissibility of screening panel decisions as an exception
to the hearsay rule. Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 428 (N.D. Ind.), aj'd, 603
F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 309, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 126 (1976).
248. See note 208 supra. The federal district court in Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F.
Supp. 421, 428 (N.D. Ind.), ar7'd, 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979), likened the admissibility of a panel
decision to that of an expert opinion permitted under FED. R. EViD. 702-706.
249. Redish, supra note 7, at 793; see text & notes 54-55 supra. Another possible reason for
excluding the panel's findings at a subsequent trial is to maintain an atmosphere of mediation
during the panel proceedings. Redish, supra note 7, at 767 n.55.
250. See text & notes 51-53 supra.
251. FED. R. EVID. 302.
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privileged communications, 252 and competency of witnesses253 explic-
itly provide that state law as to these matters should be followed in civil
actions in which "State law supplies the rule of decision" regarding an
element of a claim or defense.254 Thus, Congress not only preserved
prior Erie principles with respect to burden of proof and presump-
tions, 255 it also extended Erie to encompass privileges and compe-
tency. 6 Such evidentiary rules further substantive state policies, and
in diversity actions Congress has determined that such policies should
be respected. Burdens of proof and presumptions are intended to favor
one party or claim over another and their application will have a sub-
stantial impact on the enforcement of substantive rights and obliga-
tions.2 57  Even if privileged communications do not affect the
enforcement of a particular claim, they reflect strong state interests in
the confidentiality of certain transactions and human relationships. 258
Competency, which relates to whether a particular witness should be
prohibited from testifying, might also, at times, reflect a strong state
policy, as in the case of a "dead man's statute." 259
Similarly, the evidentiary rules contained in screening panel legis-
lation seek to effectuate substantive policies. If the panel decision is
admissible, it is expected to benefit the party in whose favor it was ren-
dered, making its operation similar to that of a burden of proof or pre-
sumption.260 If the panel decision is not admissible, the state has
252. Id 501.
253. Id 601.
254. With respect to claims and defenses based on federal law, the rules provide for uniform
"federal" standards. See id 301, 302, 501, 601.
255. Burden of proof and presumptions were treated by the Supreme Court as "substantive"
for Erie purposes even prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Palmer v. Hoff-
man, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (burden of proof); Cities Serv. Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212
(1939) (burden of proof); Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959) (presump-
tions). Presumptions are now explicitly covered in FED. R. EVID. 302, and since the rules do not
cover burden of proof, prior law is left intact. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, at
§ 2409.
256. There was disagreement prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence concerning
the treatment to be accorded such rules under Erie. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
29, at §§ 2406, 2408; Weinstein, supra note 243, at 370-73.
257. Degnan, supra note 241, at 299; Redish & Phillips, supra note 119, at 394; Weinstein,
supra note 243, at 363-64.
258. Ely, supra note 57, at 738-40; Redish & Phillips, supra note 119, at 394.
Privileges for confidential communications are created because the state thinks a particu-
lar relationship-attorney-client, husband-wife, journalist-source-is sufficiently impor-
tant that it should be fostered by preserving confidentiality in the relationship even at the
cost of losing evidence that would help to determine the truth in later litigation.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 64, § 93, at 461.
259. A dead man's statute generally prohibits a party from testifying about a transaction with
a decedent in an action against the decedent's estate. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. § 4519 (McKinney
1963). One of its purposes is to protect estates from fraudulent claims. Weinstein, supra note 243,
at 365.
260. Although most states provide that panel findings are to be given whatever weight the jury
chooses, it seems clear the introduction of the decision is intended to influence the jury in favor of
the party who prevailed before the panel. See text & notes 49-55 supra. In Maryland, a federal
court should have little difficulty in allowing that state's arbitration panel award into evidence as a
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decided to avoid any possibility of undue influence on the jury and, in
effect, has rendered the panel's "expert opinion" incompetent.26" ' In
such case, the panel decision should be inadmissible in federal court
because Federal Rule of Evidence 601 requires conformity with state
practice regarding competency of witnesses.262 Although the panel
opinion is not literally a "witness," Rule 601 has been held to encom-
pass "documents or other written evidence" in a case involving a toxi-
cologist's report in a vehicular accident case where the state rule against
admissibility of such report "embodie[d] a clear, unequivocal public
policy. '263 State rules either excluding or admitting screening panel
decisions also embody an "unequivocal" legislative policy to which
federal courts should yield.2"
A Hanna analysis buttresses the conclusion that state law should
be followed, particularly in the case of a state rule of nonadmissibility
following preaction screening. For example, assume that a nonresident
plaintiff obtains a favorable panel ruling but the defendant refuses to
settle. In choosing a court in which to sue the defendant, plaintiff un-
doubtedly will pick the federal forum if it is believed that the panel
findings will be held admissible, contrary to state practice. Such admis-
sibility would produce inequitable administration of the law with re-
spect to similarly situated defendants sued in state courts and resident
plaintiffs unable to sue in federal court.2 65
Case law dealing with the interplay between Erie and the Federal
presumption within the meaning of FED. R. EVID. 302, since the award is "presumed to be correct,
and the burden is on the party rejecting it to prove that it is not correct." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (Supp. 1979).
261. Several courts have likened the panel decision to the opinion of an expert witness. Hines
v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 428 (N.D. Ind.), aft'd, 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979);
Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 580, 570 P.2d 744,749 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb.
97, 107, 256 N.W.2d 657, 665 (1977); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 309, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122,
126 (1976), aJ'd on other grounds, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977);
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 526-28, 261 N.W.2d 434, 450-51 (1978).
262. It might also be argued that the inadmissibility of a panel decision is analogous in func-
tion to a privileged communication, which must be excluded from evidence in federal courts pur-
suant to FED. R. EviD. 501. Some states disallowing the admissibility of panel findings describe
the entire screening process as "confidential." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2609 (Supp. 1979); IDAHO
CODE § 6-1001 (1979); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2807 (Supp. 1978-79).
263. Bearce v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 549, 553 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (local statute explicitly
provided that the results of toxicologist's examinations "shall not be admissible in evidence in any
action of any kind in any court").
264. In view of the competency test in FED. R. EvID. 601, compliance with state law is also
required with respect to the calling. of panel members as witnesses at the trial. Although the
substantive policies furthered by qualification or disqualification of panelists as witnesses are less
clear than those surrounding the admissibility of the findings, see note 50 supra, the federal rule
eliminates the necessity of making such an inquiry.
265. The forum shopping dimension would be eliminated if the same situation arose in federal
court in a postcommencement panel state, because the outcome of the panel hearing would not be
known at the time of selection of the judicial forum. The inequity argument, however, would still
be valid. In the unlikely event that a federal court would choose a rule of exclusion in conflict
with a state rule allowing the panel findings into evidence, the Hanna analysis is persuasive in the
case of a plaintiff who loses before the panel.
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Rules of Evidence in the context of malpractice panel findings is sparse.
In Woods v. Holy Cross Hos.pital,266 the Fifth Circuit held in a footnote
"that the admissibility of panel findings is so important a part of the
mediation panel framework that [Florida's statute] must be enforced in
a federal diversity case. ' 267 Quoting language from a prior opinion ap-
plying a Texas rule of evidence,268 the court "'recognize[d] in [Flor-
ida's statute] one of those rare evidentiary rules which is so bound up
with state substantive law that federal courts sitting in [Florida] should
accord it the same treatment as state courts in order to give full effect to
[Florida's] substantive policy.' ",269 In recognition of the significant
substantive goals of screening panels, other federal courts should fol-
low the lead of the Fifth Circuit in adhering to state evidentiary rules
allowing admissibility of panel findings. Likewise, in a state with a rule
of nonadmissibility, the federal court should give it "the same treat-
ment as state courts in order to give full effect to [the state's] substantive
policy.
2 70
The Seventh Amendment
Although conformity to screening panel legislation is required by
Erie and the Federal Rules of Evidence, attention must also be paid to
the seventh amendment, which provides "[i]n Suits at common law,
...the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."'271 Although no state
screening procedure denies malpractice litigants the opportunity to
have the claim ultimately heard and decided by a jury, compliance
with such procedure might present an unconstitutional "interference"
with the right of jury trial.272 The most troublesome argument is that
266. 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979).
267. Id at 1178 n.23.
268. Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1976). The Texas
statute governing wrongful death actions had been amended to permit the admissibility into evi-
dence of the fact of remarriage by the surviving spouse. Id at 839. The district court had refused
to apply the amendment, possibly in reliance upon FED. R. EvID. 403 (exclusion of prejudicial or
confusing evidence). Id at 838. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the court should have
"recognized an exception to the inapplicability of Erie to evidentiary questions," since the state
rule of evidence was "embedded in Texas substantive law and policy." Id at 839. The Texas
legislature had passed the amendment "doubtless to forestall further use of the tactics employed
here to create a misleading impression of continuing widowhood. Id
269. 591 F.2d at 1169 n.6. The Woods court also relied upon the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1978), which disapproved the South
Carolina District Court's refusal to admit into evidence a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
in a diversity action for personal injuries against a car manufacturer. The Stonehocker court
determined that such relevant evidence was admissible under FED. R. EvID. 402. Id at 155. The
court, however, noted that "there are some matters of State policy so basic that they should be
accorded the same treatment they have in the State courts even under the new rules." Id at 156.
In the instant case, there was "no stated policy of South Carolina either favoring the admissibility
of such evidence or disfavoring it." Id at 155.
270. Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 837, 838 (5th Cir. 1976).
271. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
272. See generally Lenore, supra note 7, at 419-23; Note, supra note 7, at 328-36.
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admitting panel decisions into evidence will have a strong influence on
the jury, unfairly prejudicing the party against whom the decision was
rendered. This argument rests on the "assumption that no jury could
evaluate a medical malpractice panel's recommendation with objectiv-
ity, or follow a trial court's instructions regarding the weight to be
given it." 73 Another alleged ground of interference, applicable to all
panels regardless of whether the findings are admissible into evidence,
is the delayed access to a jury inherent in the screening process.
Woods v. Holy Cross HospitalzT" upheld screening legislation
against these seventh amendment challenges. 75 In Woods, the Fifth
Circuit denied that Florida's panel procedure unduly delayed plaintiff's
access to a jury, stating that "[n]othing in the seventh amendment re-
quires that a jury make its findings at the earliest possible moment in
the course of civil litigation. 2 76 Further, the admission into evidence
of the panel findings "does not unconstitutionally usurp the function of
a seventh amendment-required jury."2 77 The court stressed that the
panel findings, although relevant evidence, are not binding on the jury.
Although the Florida statute forbids panelists from testifying as wit-
nesses, the panel decision may be impeached through the presentation
of the same witnesses and exhibits that were presented to the panel,
leaving the jury free to reach its own conclusions.278
The Fifth Circuit relied upon two Supreme Court opinions,
Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad279 and In re Peterson.28 In Meeker,
the defendant railroad argued that its seventh amendment rights were
violated during a rate discrimination trial by the introduction of ad-
verse findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission rendered in
prior proceedings before that agency.28' The Court held that the rele-
vant statute making such findings admissible as prima facie evidence
did not violate the seventh amendment.282 The provision "cu[t] off no
defense, interpose[d] no obstacle to a full contestation of all the issues,
and [took] no question of fact from either court or jury."283
The Peterson Court upheld the constitutionality under the seventh
273. Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 307, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125 (1976), a jd on other
grounds, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977).
274. 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979).
275. Federal courts have been instructed to determine the right to jury trial in accordance with
federal law, even in diversity actions. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963). The seventh
amendment is inapplicable in state courts. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974).
276. 591 F.2d at 1178.
277. Id at 1181.
278. Id at 1180.
279. 236 U.S. 412 (1915).
280. 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
281. 236 U.S. at 430.
282. Id
283. Id
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amendment of a procedure similar in many respects to pretrial screen-
ing of malpractice claims. In a diversity action for alleged payments
due under a sales contract, the trial court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to appoint an auditor to conduct a hearing and submit a report
setting forth his opinion as to the amount due plaintiff on each disputed
invoice.284 Plaintiff petitioned for a writ revoking the order on the
grounds, inter alia, that the procedure violated his seventh amendment
rights. The Supreme Court held that "[n]o incident of the jury trial is
modified or taken away either by the preliminary, tentative hearing
before the auditor or by the use to which his report may be put."'285
The jury's power to make the ultimate determination of fact was unob-
structed, because the auditor's report "will be treated, at most, asprima
facie evidence. . . . The parties will remain as free to call, examine,
and cross-examine witnesses as if the report had not been made."2 86
The Supreme Court's opinions in Meeker and Peterson indicate
that neither the inherent delay nor the admission into evidence of the
findings of medical malpractice screening panels would violate the sev-
enth amendment. Although a jury, in fact, might be influenced by the
panel decision, it nevertheless will remain the final arbiter of all the
issues. In all states except Maryland, the jury will be instructed to
ascribe only such weight to the panel decision as it chooses.287 As in
Peterson, the parties may "call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses
as if the [panel's] report had not been made. '288 The ability to impeach
the panel decision will be even greater in states allowing the calling of
panelists as witnesses.289 The fact that the reference procedure sanc-
284. 253 U.S. at 304-05.
285. Id at 311.
286. Id The auditor's report, unlike most screening panel decisions, was not automatically
admissible into evidence. Id at 312. The court retained the power to approve or reject the report,
id, a procedure which has been carried over into FED. R. Civ. P. 53, governing federal masters'
reports. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2), (3).
Peterson provides the constitutional underpinning for Rule 53, which allows references to
masters in jury trial cases "when the issues are complicated." FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). See 5A J.
MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 207, 1 53.14[3]. References to masters are compared to malprac-
tice screening panels in note 208 supra.
287. See note 49 supra.
288. 253 U.S. at 311.
289. See, e.g., Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 758, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 748 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
("the 'attacking' party could attempt to neutralize the impact of the recommendation by demon-
strating that the panel hearing was neither as detailed, incisive, nor far-reaching as the jury trial
itself"); Fuchsberg & Turkewitz, supra note 54, at 26.
The inability to call panelists as witnesses for purposes of cross-examination or otherwise
does not render the admissibility of the panel decision unconstitutional. Woods v. Holy Cross
Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1180 (5th Cir. 1979). The parties are still free to "impeach" the panel
finding by introduction before the jury of the same evidence presented before the panel. Id The
parties might also comment during opening and closing arguments on the nature of panel pro-
ceedings, the composition of the panel, the evidence presented before the panel, and the panel
decision itself. See Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 580-81, 570 P.2d 744, 748-49 (1977);
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 527, 261 N.W.2d 434, 451 (1978). Further, as in the case of
other items of evidence, a federal judge may comment on the panel decision. See II J. MooRE &
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tioned by the Supreme Court in Peterson involved a report only as to
findings of fact, whereas panel decisions contain an opinion on the ulti-
mate issue of liability, should not make a difference.29° Admissible
panel decisions frequently have been analogized to the opinions of ex-
pert witnesses,29' who are permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence
to render opinions on ultimate issues.292 Juries are aided, not dis-
placed, by such opinions.293
The holding of the Fifth Circuit in Woods is sound, and all of the
district courts passing on the seventh amendment issues have reached
similar conclusions.294 The only contrary authority is that of the Illi-
nois Supreme Court295 and an Ohio trial court296 with respect to state
constitutional provisions governing the right to jury trial. All other
state appellate courts have upheld the constitutionality of panel proce-
H. BENDIX, supra note 242, at § 105.01[41 app.; 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note'202,
107[3].
290. Note, supra note 7, at 232-33.
291. See note 261 supra.
292. FED. R. EVID. 704. See I1 J. MOORE & M. BENDIX, supra note 242, 1 704.10, at VII-66
("[O]pinion testimony on ultimate issues ... will aid the trier, but not supplant nor invade his
province, since it is the trier of fact who ultimately determines what weight to give the opinion
testimony of the witness."). Similarly, the federal master's report, admissible in ajury trial pursu-
ant to FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(3), has been described as the report of an expert witness which the
jury may accept or reject as it sees fit. 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 207, §§ 53.14[3]-[4].
293. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 524, 261 N.W.2d 434,449 (1978) ("[B]y identifying
and focusing complex issues, the panels aid jury determination of those cases which do go to
trial."). See also Redish, supra note 7, at 793; Rxfor New York, supra note 2, at 498; Note, supra
note 7, at 333.
294. See Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468, 473-74 (E.D. La. 1979);
Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 426-28 (N.D. Ind.), a fd on other grounds, 603
F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979); Davison v. Sinai Hosp., 462 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978).
Hines is the only district court opinion containing a significant discussion of the issues. The
court summarily dismissed the delay argument because the plaintiffs had "failed to detail how
even presumed costs and delays affect the right to trial by jury." 465 F. Supp. at 428. The admis-
sibility of the panel decision was upheld as a "reasonable chang[e] in the procedure surrounding
the right to trial by jury." Id at 427. Admissible panel findings were likened to an exception to
the hearsay rule and to an expert witness's opinion. Id at 428.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit refused to reach the federal constitutional question because of
,.an inadequate record." 603 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1979). No facts had been developed in the
district court that were relevant to the delay, expenses and increased burden of proof allegedly
impairing the right to jury trial. Id The court "decline[d] to make a constitutional adjudication in
advance of demonstrated facts supporting the asserted unconstitutional results of the Act's appli-
cation." Id
295. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). Under the
Illinois statute, panel findings are not admissible at trial. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(4)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). The court's holding that the Illinois panel was "an impermissible re-
striction on the right to trial by jury," id at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741, apparently was based on the
delay in access to jury trial. The case is criticized in Redish, supra note 7, at 793-95; Note, supra
note 7, at 329-30; 1977 Wis. L. REV. 203. See Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 525, 261
N.W.2d 434, 450 (1978) ("The [Illinois] court's discussion of this issue was purely conclusory...
and offers no guidance for this court.").
296. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976). The
Ohio court found that the admissibility into evidence of the panel decision "effectively and sub-
stantially reduces a party's ability to prove his case, because that party must persuade a jury that
the decision of the arbitrators was incorrect, a task not easily accomplished in view of the added
weight which juries have traditionally accorded the testimony of experts." Id at 168, 355 N.E.2d
at 908.
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dures against challenges based on the right of trial by jury.297 When
the jury trial issue arises in future federal court actions, the majority
view should be followed.
CONCLUSION
Whether screening panels are serving their intended purpose of
easing the medical malpractice crisis through curtailment of courtroom
litigation is uncertain. Screening procedures have the potential for in-
creasing litigation costs rather than reducing them, since claims which
proceed to trial will have been delayed and the expenses of two hear-
ings will have been incurred.29 Some medical professionals may dis-
like screening procedures in the belief that plaintiffs use them merely as
discovery devices.299 Further, there is no guarantee that the plaintiff
will not resort to ajury trial.3"0 It remains to be seen whether the bene-
fits of screening exceed the disadvantages in the overall scheme of con-
trolling the medical malpractice problem.
The principles of federalism underlying Erie ensure that federal
courts will not frustrate the experiment by refusing to apply screening
procedures in diversity actions. The substantive policies underlying
screening legislation are far too important to be cast aside in deference
to federal interests in controlling the "character" of adjudication in fed-
297. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 580-81, 570 P.2d 744, 748-49 (1977) (neither delay
factor nor admissibility of panel decision prevents jury from acting as final arbiter); Attorney Gen.
v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 291-97, 385 A.2d 57, 67-70 (admissibility of award merely alters the
burden of proof; parties are free to attack the award with whatever evidence and arguments they
wish), appeal dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 60 (1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., - Mass. -, -, 369 N.E.2d
985, 991 (1977) (bond requirement does not obstruct access to a jury); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199
Neb. 97, 107-09, 256 N.W.2d 657, 665-66 (1977) (panel decision is equivalent to expert testimony;
jury remains ultimate arbiter); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 307-09, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125-
28 (1976), ai'don other grounds, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977) (panel
decision is, in effect, an expert opinion, which may be weighed by the jury as it chooses); Halpern
v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 758-59, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 748-49 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (jury can be expected
to exercise its independence in deciding the case); Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 116-28,
394 A.2d 932, 937-43 (1978) (requirement of pretrial proceeding is not an onerous burden and is
counterbalanced, in any event, by potential for swift adjudication at minimal cost; availability of
trial de novo does not preclude jury's consideration of panel award as evidence).
A thorough discussion of the jury trial issue is contained in Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d
491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). The Wisconsin court rejected the costs-and-delays argument, liken-
ing the preliminary hearing procedures to the "exhaustion-of-remedies requirement" that litigants
avail themselves of applicable administrative agency proceedings prior to court action. Id at 524-
25, 261 N.W.2d at 450. The court answered the undue influence argument by noting that the jury
retains the ultimate power of decision and that the parties are free to impeach the panel decision.
Id at 524-26, 261 N.W.2d at 451. Further, the decision "should help to focus and clarify the
issues, which are often highly technical, for the benefit of the jury." Id at 528, 261 N.W.2d at 451.
In sum, the panel decision is "simply evidence to be weighed by the jury and accepted or rejected,
as with any other evidence." Id
298. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 807-08 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Abraham, supra note 13, at 516-17; Redish, sutpra note 7, at 768;
Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation, supra note 2, at 681; Bard & Krevitsky, supra note 54, at
4.
299. Comment, supra note 3, at 1458.
300. See Roth, supra note 2, at 497; Rxfor New York, supra note 2, at 496.
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eral courts. Although the seventh amendment forbids enforcement of
state practices altering the role of the jury in federal court, neither the
screening process nor subsequent admissibility of panel findings pre-
vents the jury from performing its traditional function. In a litigation-
prone society, federal courts should welcome partnership with the
states in testing the effectiveness of mechanisms designed to encourage
resolution of disputes outside of the courtroom in a fair, speedy, and
inexpensive manner.

